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Abstract  
 
As essential components of the Cold War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War have played 
significant roles in global policy among the Western forces under the leadership of the United 
States and the Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union in the 20th century. Communist China, 
founded in 1949, was also part of the countries behind the Iron Curtain and provided substantial 
support to North Korea and North Vietnam in their fight against their ideological enemies. 
Despite the extensive research by scholars on the Korean War and the Vietnam War, as well as 
China’s role in both of these wars, it is interesting to know whether China’s role and attitude had 
changed from one war to the other. This thesis examines and compares China’s military 
interference in the Korean War in the beginning of the 1950s with its involvement more than ten 
years later in the Vietnam War through the investigation of China’s motives to enter the wars and 
their ways of support in connection with the development of foreign relations. While contrasting 
China’s role and involvement in Korea and Vietnam, similarities, but also major differences 
become distinguishable. This thesis argues that these major differences indicate a Chinese 
rethinking about a possible involvement in Vietnam because of China’s domestic problems and 
its foreign policy developments at that time. 
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1. Introduction 
The Korean War and the Vietnam War - both “proxy wars” between the communist and 
capitalist camps and therefore significant parts of the Cold War - are among the fiercest military 
conflicts of the last century. The People’s Republic of China involved itself in both wars on 
behalf of its communist sister states, although the nature of Chinese involvement in the two wars 
differed. Chinese soldiers actively fought on Korean territory and China officially participated in 
the war as one of the war parties, whereas China’s involvement in Vietnam was more reserved 
and limited to the deployment of defensive and engineering troops. 
Both the Korean and Vietnam Wars resulted from tensions created by post-colonial 
political solutions to the decolonization process. Vietnam was occupied by France in the middle 
of the 19th century and became a French colony. Similar to Vietnam, Korea was also colonialized 
and annexed by the Japanese in the beginning of the 20th century. As a consequence of World 
War II and the surrender of Japan, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel into North and South 
Korea. North Korea became a communist state, whereas a pro- Western government was 
established in the South. The Korean War started in 1950 when the Korean People’s Army 
crossed the border to South Korea and began their attacks on American airbases with the aim of 
occupying the South and reuniting the whole country under a communist leadership. The 
Vietnam War began with the fight of the Vietnamese for independence against the French 
occupying power and ended with the communist occupation of Saigon and the founding of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976. Similar to Korea, Vietnam was divided into North 
Vietnam (communist) and South Vietnam (pro- American) at the 17th parallel due to the Geneva 
Accords of 1954 with the expectation that it be reunited under free elections in 1956. These 
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elections, however, never took place and in 1964 the war started with the Gulf of Tonkin incident 
when a sea battle between North Vietnamese and US Navy ships arose. 
Both of these confrontations, however, were not simply national conflicts between North 
and South, but turned into international conflicts through the interference of the United States, 
the Soviet Union and also China. The role of China was especially important in both wars, as the 
Chinese government was willing to provide significant military and economic support to their 
North Korean and North Vietnamese allies. In both cases, China was concerned with the 
potential impact of US imperialism on its borders and its own domestic politics, but for various 
reasons the role that China carved out for itself in each case was different.  
This thesis argues that the Chinese involvement in Korea differed from its actions in 
Vietnam because of the internal problems China had to face at that time, such as the outcomes of 
the Great Leap Forward and the events of the Cultural Revolution, and the readjustment of 
China’s foreign policy focus in the 1960s and 1970s. It describes, compares and analyzes 
China’s role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars in order to determine how and why China’s 
support and attitude changed from one war to the next. Chapter one begins with an investigation 
of Chinese involvement in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and China’s possible motives that 
resulted in becoming an ally of North Korea and a war party against the United States. After that, 
the question about the Chinese participation in the planning of the war, which is still highly 
discussed among scholars today, will be examined, followed by a survey of China’s supportive 
measures and commitment in the course of the war in order to clarify their important role as a 
North Korean ally. The first chapter will conclude with an illustration of the outcomes and the 
consequences of the war for China. Chapter two focuses on the significance of China’s role in 
Vietnam. It begins with the events of the Geneva Conference in 1954 and mainly focuses on the 
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Second Indochina War, starting with the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964 and ending with the 
defeat of South Vietnam in 1975. This investigation also concentrates on China’s motives for 
supporting the war, their methods of support, and the consequences of the war with the aim of 
illustrating prominent differences and similarities with China’s involvement in the Korean War. 
Chapter three evaluates these differences and similarities in motives, support, the attitude 
towards negotiations, and the role of the Soviet Union in order to describe and analyze changes 
in China’s approach to dealing with what it saw as US imperialism on its borders.  
The study makes use of several important primary sources such as military speeches, 
commands and other statements of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai concerning the Korean and the 
Vietnam War. In addition, unlike existing studies, this thesis draws upon the experiences and 
memoirs of retired People’s Liberation Army generals who played a significant role in the 
Korean War, such as for example Peng Dehuai and Nie Rongzhen. These recollections were 
compiled and translated into English by Xiaobing Li, Allan Millet and Bin Yu and offer 
individual perspectives and experiences of people who were actively involved in the war. 
Although these generals were politically indoctrinated, their memoirs provide a personal insight 
into China’s involvement, from the decision to enter the war to the armistice negotiations.  
Multiple studies have been conducted regarding China’s involvement in the Korean and 
the Vietnam Wars. Many historians have dealt with this subject by using newly accessible 
archival material and investigating topics such as China’s motives to enter the wars, its form of 
support and Chinese foreign policy during these wars. One of the more influential historians who 
conducted a comprehensive study about China’s decision to enter the Korean War was Allen 
Whiting, whose work has formed a foundation upon which later scholars have built. He came to 
the conclusion that Chinese motives were characterized by a xenophobic attitude, expansionist 
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tendencies, concerns about China’s national security and the influence of its communist 
ideology.1 His conclusions about these motives are still highly accepted in the west and form the 
basis for later research. Numerous scholars, such as Thomas Christensen, Zhihai Zhai, Zhihua 
Shen, Yufan Hao, Wanli Hu, Chae-Jin Lee, Chao Guo and Rongrong Ren also argue that the 
main reason for China to intervene in Korea was their security concerns and that US aggression 
in Asia and the crossing of the 38th parallel by US troops triggered China’s involvement because 
a Korean peninsula fully controlled by the United States would pose a great threat for China.2 
Jian Chen, on the other hand, mainly considers Chinese motives as having been characterized by 
a wish to develop the new state’s foreign policy and to gain international recognition. Chen 
draws on Whiting’s earlier conclusions by arguing that China’s intention to maintain 
revolutionary momentum within Asia led to their willingness to help their North Korean 
comrades.3 Sergei Goncharov and John Lewis also argue in their book Uncertain Partners: 
Stalin, Mao and the Korean War that China was animated by their sense of responsibility to 
defend communist interests in Asia. They argue, however, that this sense of responsibility was 
incited by Stalin in order to transfer the main burden of support for the war to China.4  
Patrick Roe, who served in the Seventh Marine Regiment during the war in Korea, also 
deals with China’s motives and its final decision to intervene. In addition, he further analyzes 
                                                          
1 Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 2. 
2 Thomas Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War 
Telegrams,” International Security, Vol. 17, No.1 (1992): 135; Yufan Hao and Zhihai Zhai, “China's Decision to 
Enter the Korean War: History  Revisted,” The China Quarterly 121 (1990): 103; Zhihua Shen, “China Sends 
Troops to Korea: Beijing’s Policy-Making Process,” In China and the United States: A New Cold War History, 
edited by Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li (New York: Univ. Press of America, 1998), 37; Wanli Hu, “Mao’s America 
Strategy and the Korean War,” In China and the United States: A New Cold War History, edited by Xiaobing Li and 
Hongshan Li (New York: Univ. Press of America, 1998), 317; Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations 
(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1996), 11-13; Chao Guo and Rongrong Ren, “Learning and Problem 
Representation in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: China’s Decision to enter the Korean War Revisited,” Public 
Administration Quarterly 27 (Fall, 2003- Winter 2004): 303. 
3 Jian Chen, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 213-214. 
4 Sergei Goncharov and John Wilson Lewis, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), 203-205. 
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this decision, examines its impact on the war and concludes that China’s intervention in Korea 
had led to an increased risk of another global war.5 The Chinese involvement in Korea is also 
one of the main focuses of the studies of Jun Yasuda, who describes China’s participation from 
the first three military campaigns until the commencement of the armistice talks. Unlike other 
studies that exclusively focus on the analysis of China’s motives to enter the war, Yasuda 
answers the questions of how the war was executed and how China sought to end the war after 
the decision to intervene was made.6 Shu Guang Zhang also deals with China’s war in Korea, but 
his approach is to focus on the military history of the Korean War through Chinese eyes from the 
decision-making process to the armistice negotiations.7  
While dealing with China’s role in Korea, many scholars also focus on the trilateral 
relations between China, North Korea and the Soviet Union during the war. Hak-joon Kim, B.C. 
Koh and Chae –Jin Lee all argue that North Korea took advantage of the growing differences 
between China and the Soviet Union in order to receive as much support as possible. In addition, 
Lee examines the question of whether China knew about the war plans of Kim Il Sung and states 
that Mao Zedong was fully aware of the planning and encouraged Kim Il Sung’s intentions.8  
Similar to studies about China’s involvement in the Korean War, many scholars also 
focus specifically on China’s role in the Second Indochina War. One of the most comprehensive 
works about China in the Vietnam War was written by Qiang Zhai, who describes China’s 
involvement, its motives and the impact of its relationship with North Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union on the war. Zhai invokes ideological and geopolitical motives as possible reasons for 
                                                          
5 Patrick Roe, The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War, June-December 1950 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000), 
191. 
6 Jun Yasuda, “A Survey: China and the Korean War,” Social Science Japan Journal 1 (1998): 81. 
7 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1995), 1. 
8 B.C. Koh, “North Korea and the Sino-Soviet Schism,” The Western Political Quarterly Vol. 22,No.4 (1969): 962; 
Hak-Joon Kim , The Sino- North Korean Relations, 1945-1984 (Seoul: Korean Research Center, 1985), 107-109;  
Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations, 21-22. 
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China to get involved in Vietnam. According to him, China regarded the support it provided to 
North Vietnam as its obligation as the vanguard of communist movements all over the world, 
and the Chinese government was concerned about China’s national security in case of an 
American invasion in North Vietnam. Furthermore, he argues that the Sino- Soviet split 
influenced China’s policy toward Indochina and many other scholars, such as Shu Guang Zhang, 
Xiaoming Zhang, Jian Chen and Kuisong Yang agree with these arguments.9 In addition, Jian 
Chen and Kuisong Yang mention that the crisis in Vietnam suited Mao as he could use the 
heated sentiments against US imperialism among the Chinese population to mobilize the masses 
for the Cultural Revolution.10  
The trilateral relations between China, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam and their 
development during the Vietnam War are also the focus of numerous studies. One scholar who 
deals with the topic of Sino- Vietnamese relations in the beginning of the Second Indochina War 
is Cheng Guan Ang. He reveals that North Vietnam was independent in its decision-making, 
although its government was greatly reliant on China’s support.11 Other studies, such as Anne 
Gilks’ work The Breakdown of the Sino- Vietnamese Alliance, 1970-1979 concentrate on the 
development of these trilateral relations. In her book, Gilks analyses the factors that caused Sino- 
Vietnamese relations to deteriorate and concludes that the differences between China and North 
                                                          
9 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 
140-147; Shu Guang Zhang, “Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi and the United States: China Confrontations, 1964-1968,” In 
Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia, edited by Priscilla Roberts (Washington, 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 262; Xiaoming Zhang, “Communist Powers Divided: China, the Soviet 
Union, and the Vietnam Wars,” In International Perspectives on Vietnam, edited by Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted 
Gittinger (College Station, Tex.: Texas A & M University Press, 2000), 81; Jian Chen, “China‘s involvement in the 
Vietnam War, 1964-1969,” The China Quarterly, No. 142 (1995): 361; Kuisong  Yang, “Mao Zedong and the 
Indochina Wars,” In Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia, edited by Priscilla 
Roberts (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006) 56. 
10 Chen, “China‘s involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969,” 361; Yang, “Mao Zedong and the Indochina 
Wars,”78. 
11 Cheng Guan Ang, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962, 
(Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1997) 233. 
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Vietnam are the result of various misunderstandings of both actions and decisions.12 Kosal Path 
also investigates the evolution of Sino- Vietnamese relations, but he argues that the deterioration 
in relation can be ascribed to Chinese chauvinistic behavior during the Cultural Revolution that 
caused North Vietnam to distance itself from China because of its fear of Chinese 
expansionism.13 Qiang Zhai, however, argues that Chinese insensitivity to the needs of North 
Vietnam and Mao’s sense of superiority were the reasons for the decline of Sino- Vietnamese 
relations.14 Another scholar who focuses on these relationships is Xiaoming Zhang who 
examines the Sino- Soviet split and its impact on the Vietnam War. He concludes that the rivalry 
over communist leadership affected China’s overall involvement in Vietnam and thus, it is 
necessary to regard the Vietnam War not only as part of the confrontation between China and the 
United States, but also as an element in the Sino- Soviet dispute.15  
Although, as we have seen, there is a body of historical literature that examines Chinese 
involvement in Korea, on the one hand, and in Vietnam, on the other hand, no studies have been 
made that examine China's involvement in these two conflicts comparatively. One article 
“‘Resist America’: China's Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars” by Baijia Zhang, investigates 
China’s role in Korea and in Vietnam, but it focuses on the background of these wars and looks 
in particular at China’s crisis management.16 The article does not, however, contrast China’s 
direct involvement in the wars or the support it provided during the war years. 
                                                          
12 Anne Gilks, The Breakdown of the Sino- Vietnamese Alliance, 1970-1979 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian 
Studies, 1992), 19-21. 
13 Kosal Path, “Ha Noi‘s Responses to Beijing‘s Renewed Enthusiasm to Aid North Vietnam, 1970- 1972,” Journal 
of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 6, No.3 (2011):131. 
14 Qiang Zhai, “An Uneasy Relationship: China and the DRV during the Vietnam War,” In International 
Perspectives on Vietnam, edited by Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger (College Station, Tex.: Texas A & M 
University Press, 2000), 137-138. 
15 Zhang, “Communist Powers Divided,” 96-97 
16 Baijia Zhang, “‘Resist America’: China's Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars,” In Managing Sino-American 
Crises: Case Studies and Analysis, edited by Michael D. Swaine (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2006), 179-180. 
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 Such a comparison is valuable, however, in order to understand the development of the 
People’s Republic of China as a diplomatic actor. The PRC was founded in 1949 and confronted 
with its first international conflict just one year later. The Korean War was an important 
opportunity for the newly-established nation to prove itself on the international stage and to gain 
a position among the other countries in the world. By the time of the Vietnam War, however, 
China had matured as a state and its concerns had changed. A comparison of China’s 
involvement in Korea and Vietnam shows that China had experienced a rapid development in its 
national identity and become a strong nation that was better equipped to face international crisis. 
Such a comparison can also show us the lessons that China drew from its involvement in Korea 
and what impact the outcomes of the Korean War had on the Chinese decision-making process in 
the early stages of the Vietnam War.  
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2. China’s role in the Korean War 
In this initial section, Chinese military involvement in Korea will be investigated by 
illuminating China’s reasons to enter the war and its obstacles, followed by the question whether 
China took part in the planning of North Korea’s attack and knew about the idea of Kim Il Sung 
to reunite the country by force. Moreover, this chapter elaborates China’s way of support from 
the outbreak in 1950 to the signing of the armistice agreement in 1953 and ends with the 
aftermath of the war for China.  
The Korean War began on June 25, 1950 and resulted in a permanent division of the 
Korean peninsula in North and South. This division had already been decided after World War II 
and the victory over Japan. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, the three victorious powers (United 
Kingdom, United States and the Soviet Union) determined the preliminary separation of Korea, 
which had been a former Japanese colony, into two occupation zones at the 38th parallel. Thus, 
the northern part of Korea was occupied by Soviet forces, whereas the southern part was 
controlled by American forces with the intent to reunite Korea by conducting free elections at a 
later time. These elections, however, had never been conducted. As a result of the deteriorating 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Republic of Korea under the pro-
American government of Syngman Rhee was proclaimed on August 13, 1948 in the South and 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under the communist government of Kim Il Sung 
was founded on September 9, 1948 in the North. In order to occupy the South and to unify the 
country by force, troops of the Korean People’s Army crossed the border on June 25, 1950 and 
triggered the Korean War, as the UN Security Council thereupon adopted a resolution to solve 
the conflict. As a consequence of this resolution, UN troops who consisted mainly of American 
troops were sent to Korea to prevent a North Korean occupation of the South. On September 15, 
10 
 
1950, the UN troops started their counteroffensive, but their advance was halted by the Chinese 
troops who entered the war on behalf of North Korea in October. The UN troops were driven 
back by the Chinese forces and had to retreat. These alternate victories and defeats of both sides 
characterized the battles until the war had changed into a trench war in June 1951, resulting in 
two-year armistice negotiations. The battles in Korea ended on July 27, 1953 with the signing of 
the final armistice agreement in Panmunjom. 
China’s intervention in the war events was essential for the outcome of the war because 
the Chinese support meant a shift in the power structures. Although China and North Korea were 
incapable of achieving their objectives and to expel the US forces from the South, they could 
successfully resist the attacks and were able to prevent an entire US invasion in the North.   
 
2.1 China’s motives to enter the war  
China’s reasons to intervene during the Korean War were numerous. Patrick Roe states 
that they wanted to protect the Sino- Korean border from any military conflicts between Chinese 
and American troops to maintain the industrial security of Manchuria, as China considered the 
attack on North Korea to be an attack on China. Especially Manchuria was the most important 
heavy industrial center of China at that time and Chinese leaders worried about China’s peaceful 
environment for its domestic reconstruction,1 as Zhou Enlai expressed in a report on October 24, 
1950 the following: 
China and Korea are neighboring countries as closely related as lips and teeth. If the lips are gone, the teeth are 
exposed to the cold. If the D.P.R.K is subjugated by U.S. imperialism, there will be no security for northeast 
China. Half of our heavy industry is in the Northeast, and half of the heavy industry in the Northeast is in its 
southern parts, within range of enemy bombers.2   
 
                                                          
1 Roe, The Dragon Strikes, 68.  
2 Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), 60. 
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Marshal Nie Rongzhen also expressed his concerns:  
It could be disadvantageous to all if we did not send our troops. First, when the enemy reached the bank of the 
Yalu River, the international and domestic reactionary bluster would surely grow louder. This would not only be 
disadvantageous to our country, but it would also pose an even bigger threat to Northeast China. The entire 
Northeastern Border Defense Army would be tied down there, and the electric power plan in South Manchuria 
would be subject to the enemy’s threat. After all, we believed that we should enter the war and that we must 
participate in it. Our entering the war could be most rewarding; failing to do so would cause great harm.3 
 
Allen Whiting has described China historically as a nation with “xenophobic attitudes with 
expansionist tendencies.”4 This xenophobia was caused and increased in the end of the 19th and 
the beginning of the 20th century when China’s territorial sovereignty was shattered by foreign 
nations and ideologically penetrated by Western missionary groups. The Chinese empire which 
regarded itself as the “Middle Kingdom” was degraded to a semi-colony by other foreign powers 
and its national dignity and pride was humiliated.5 Zhou Enlai reminded the Chinese of this 
shameful past and compared it with the policy of the United States, as he stated in his report on 
October 24, 1950:  
The U.S. imperialists are pursuing the policy of MacArthur in the East, using Japan as their base, inheriting the 
mantle of Japanese militarism and taking their cue from history since the Sino- Japanese War of 1894. They are 
following the old maxim that anyone wanting to annex China must first occupy its Northeast and that to occupy 
the Northeast he must first seize Korea. While the Japanese imperialists spent 40 years inching their way towards 
that goal, the U.S. imperialists want to accomplish it in four or five years.6 
 
In addition, Korea was formally a Chinese tributary state and therefore the loss of Korea would 
mean a great problem of China’s territorial security and position of power in Asia, as the Chinese 
borderlands were of strategic importance. Whiting also describes North Korea as an essential 
                                                          
3 Xiaobing Li, Allan Millet, and Bin Yu, Mao's Generals Remember Korea (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of 
Kansas, 2001), 43. 
4 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu), 2. 
5 Ibid, 3-5. 
6 Zhou, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, 62. 
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buffer state between China and the American troops in South Korea.7 Zhou Enlai expressed the 
worries and fears of the CCP leadership when he said at a meeting on September 30, 1950:  
 
Moreover, timer after time, it (United States) has sent its air force in Korea to enter the airspace over the Chinese 
province of Liaodong to strafe and bomb the residents there and has ordered its naval forces off Korea to 
bombard Chinese merchant ships in international waters. These violent acts have revealed the U.S. government 
to be the most dangerous foe of the People’s Republic of China. U.S. forces have invaded China’s borders and 
may at any time expand their invasion.8 
 
After the outbreak of the Korean War the US government decided to “neutralize” the Taiwan 
Strait by sending the 7th Fleet between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. Shu Guang Zhang 
states that China believed that the US military policies towards the aggression of North Korea 
were actually aimed at preventing China from the reunification with Taiwan. Thus, the Chinese 
regarded the US military presence in South Korea as a threat to their national security and 
decided to support North Korea.9 At that time the military leader Marshal Nie Rongzhen said: 
“The United States occupied Taiwan as well, a territory of our country […] Thus, the American 
imperialists forced a war on the Chinese people.”10 
Furthermore, Whiting believes that a US victory in North Korea could encourage Chiang 
Kai-shek and the GMD to launch new attacks on the Chinese mainland and Mao’s greatest 
concern was the security of his newly established regime, as he assumed that North Korea will 
be attacked first by the American troops and then they will continue their offensives towards 
China itself.11 Chinese leaders also worried that the presence of US troops in Korea could 
endanger the communist control of China and that is why Thomas Christensen stated that Mao’s 
primary aim was to destroy all foreign forces on the Korean peninsula, especially after the 
                                                          
7 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, 3; Hu, “Mao’s America Strategy and the Korean War,” 315. 
8 Zhou, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, 46. 
9 Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 56. 
10 Li, Millet, and Yu, Mao's Generals Remember Korea, 39. 
11 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, 159; Hao and Zhai, “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History  
Revisted,” 103. 
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Incheon landing which deteriorated the situation in Korea and further jeopardized China’s 
security because it meant a fast shift of the combat zone to the North.12  
Another reason for China to intervene in the Korean War, which is mentioned by  
Whiting, is the ideological linkage between China and the North Korean leadership under Kim Il 
Sung as sister states and the ultimate ambition of communist ideology. At the time of the 
Japanese colonial rule in Korea and China’s war of resistance against Japan in the late 1930s, 
Korea and China backed each other in the fight against the Japanese invaders. During the war of 
resistance against Japan in China, Kim Il- Sung actively supported China by leading a division of 
allied forces against Japanese troops.13 In addition, more than 100,000 Koreans fought side by 
side with the Communists against Chiang Kai- shek and his Guomindang in the Chinese Civil 
War and this caused a reciprocal claim for China’s aid during the time of the Korean War.14 Thus, 
Bruce Cummings stated that China’s entry into the war was not a defensive measure to protect 
itself, but an obligation to provide assistance because of Korea’s sacrifices in the Chinese Civil 
War and the war of resistance against Japan.15 Furthermore, as the goal of the communist 
ideology was World Communism, the destruction of the capitalist elites and the assumption of an 
omnipresent conflict, Mao also regarded the spread of communism throughout the world as one 
of his missions.16 Mao had already revealed this attitude in his article “Revolutionary Forces of 
the World Rally to Combat Imperialist Aggression” two years earlier in November 1948 by 
stating the following:  
                                                          
12 Roe, The Dragon Strikes, 68; Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace,” 128; Chen, 
China's Road to the Korean War, 159. 
13 Zhang, “‘Resist America’: China's Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars,” 181. 
14 Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 238; Cumings, 
The Origins of the Korean War Vol.2: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), 350; 364. 
15 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 284. 
16 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, 6. 
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After the victory in World War II, U.S. imperialism, which has taken the place of fascist Germany, Italy and 
Japan, together with its stooges in various countries, is frantically preparing for a new world war and is menacing 
the whole world. This reflects the extreme decay of the capitalist world and its fear of impending doom. This 
enemy still has strength. Therefore, all the revolutionary forces within each country and the revolutionary forces 
of all countries must be united. An anti- imperialist united front headed by the Soviet Union must be formed and 
a correct policy pursued, otherwise victory cannot be achieved. The foundation of this enemy is weak. It is 
collapsing internally, is divorced from the people and is confronted with an inextricable economic crisis. 
Therefore, it can be defeated. It would be a very big mistake to overestimate the strength of the enemy and to 
underestimate the strength of revolution.17 
 
The Chinese leadership also proclaimed to be one of the vanguards of the communist “national 
liberation” movements in Asia and underlined its revolutionary role until June 1950.18 Thus, it 
was impossible for Mao to reject North Korea’s wish for national unification and independence 
as a socialist brother state.19 In addition, the Korean War meant an opportunity to spread the 
influence of the Chinese revolution in Asia for the Chinese leadership and a successful and 
victorious end of the war could promote prestige on the international stage.20 In Mao’s eyes the 
world situation was divided between the nations of the “intermediate zone” and the “two camps”. 
The “two camps” consisted of the anti-imperialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the 
imperialist camp headed by the United States. These camps were separated by the “intermediate 
zone” including capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial nations in Africa, Asia and Europe.  
However, major contradictions existed between the countries of the “intermediate zone” 
and the imperialist camp which had to be resolved in Mao’s opinion. Therefore, the Korean War 
offered the possibility to resolve these contradictions and to defeat capitalism, as the crisis could 
be used as a test case for the Chinese Communists to prove their ability and their legitimization 
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to rule and to protect China’s reputation and its national interests.21 This was also emphasized in 
the following statement of Peng Dehuai: “Our forces out to be dispatched also in order to 
encourage the peoples of colonial and semicolonial countries to carry on their nationalist and 
democratic revolutions against imperialists and invasions. Our forces ought to be dispatched in 
order to extend the influence of the Socialist camp.”22 
Roe believes that Mao was also influenced in his decision to participate in the war by his 
concern over the continuing threat of Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang. As early as 1937, 
the US government actively supported Chiang Kai-shek and his fight against the Communists 
and Mao strongly believed that the United States intervened in the Chinese Civil War in order to 
rescue the Nationalists.23 Thus, the Chinese leadership feared that a victory or even the success 
of UN forces in Korea could encourage the Guomindang to attack the Chinese mainland again.24 
However, in Mao’s eyes a direct confrontation with the United States was inevitable. For him, 
Korea was one of three possible fronts (with Vietnam and Taiwan) where he expected US attacks 
and also other leaders of the CCP were convinced that revolutionary China had to take up the 
challenge and to face a military confrontation with the United States.25 Hao and Zhai claim that 
the timing of the Korean War offered a possible chance for China to win the war, as the strategic 
focus of the United States was situated in Europe after the Second World War and the CCP 
leaders assumed that it was impossible to deploy all the US forces in Asia.26 
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In addition, Zhai states that the CCP leaders Liu Shaoqi, Mao and Zhou Enlai had 
intensive nationalistic tendencies and all were determined to save China’s dignity and restore its 
power.27 Therefore, the security of China’s place in the world was another reason for China to 
support North Korea in its struggle with the United States. The Korean War started right after the 
Chinese Civil War and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. As a developing 
country which had just been established, China strongly needed diplomatic, political and 
economic support and North Korea’s attack on South Korea endangered this young nation.28 In 
order to restore China’s security, the CCP leaders had to take active measures in the war. 
Another factor which is mentioned by Whiting and could lead to the Chinese intervention 
in the Korean War was the improving relationship between the United States and Japan. Japan 
had been a serious enemy of China for a long time and the Chinese government feared that the 
rapprochement between Japan and the United States could result in an anti- communist coalition 
in Asia. The communist control of Korea, however, could be a way of averting Japan from 
regaining power in Asia and also stop the influence of the United States on Japan.29 Thus, in the 
eyes of the Chinese leadership a total UN victory in Korea, which could facilitate the alignment 
between the United States, Japan and Korea, had to be prevented.30  
 
2.2 China’s obstacles in the decision-making progress 
Although many factors suggest that the Chinese entry into the Korean War was favorable 
for China, Zhang Baijia and other scholars assert that a lot of Chinese leaders, including Mao 
were doubtful. The People’s Republic of China had only been established one year earlier and its 
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security situation was therefore tense and unstable after several years of civil war.31 Thus, Mao’s 
greatest concerns were the recovery of China’s economy, the establishment of CCP legitimacy 
and political consolidation.32 At that time, China had serious domestic problems, as the economy 
stagnated, inflation and unemployment was rising and many modern transportation facilities 
were destroyed and had to be rebuilt.33  
Furthermore, the land reform which began between 1942 and 1946 resulted in great 
distribution problems and production breakdowns.34 Additionally, the Chinese people had to 
fight against widespread flooding in 1949 which substantially hindered the reconstruction of the 
country.35 Thus, an unsuccessful deployment in the Korean War could jeopardize the recently 
established nation and enhance its domestic problems. Furthermore, for Mao it was obvious that 
China could not win the war with such economic difficulties and without the support of the 
Soviet Union.  
Whiting points out that another concern for the Chinese leadership was the issue of 
Taiwan and the relationship between the United States and the Nationalists, because Mao and his 
comrades were convinced that the United States would renew their economic, political and 
military support for the Guomindang after China would enter the war and send troops to Korea. 
The fear of another growing threat by the Guomindang on Taiwan and a possible fight on two 
fronts caused some of China’s leaders to be more reluctant towards a deployment in Korea.36 
Moreover, Korea and the dispute between North and South did not belong to China’s primary 
interests at that time, because the Chinese leadership regarded Taiwan and its annexation as their 
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only major responsibility. That is why, the main focus of China’s military lay on Taiwan, as well 
as Tibet, which was also not yet occupied by the CCP.37 Mao’s plans envisioned the conquest of 
Taiwan through negotiations; however, China’s entry into the war and the military confrontation 
with the United States could endanger these negotiations and reinforce China’s dependence on 
Stalin and the Soviet Union.38  
Furthermore, the insufficient military situation and the outstanding pacification of South 
China were reasons for Mao to reconsider a military intervention in Korea. In South China there 
were still over 400 000 Nationalist guerillas still fighting against the troops of the CCP and the 
economic situation required a reduction of military expenditures.39 These areas still had to be 
liberated and to undergo agrarian reform.40 After the Civil War the troops of the People’s 
Liberation Army were also not ready for another military confrontation because of their combat 
fatigue and inadequate training.41 Thus, Mao had to admit that the military power of the PLA 
could not keep up with the superior US military in the Korean War, as the troops only had 
backward arms and were poorly equipped compared to US troops, especially significant was the 
lack of naval and air weaponry.42  
For Whiting, the UN also played an important role in terms of Chinese obstacles, as 
China’s intervention in the Korean War could endanger its efforts and aspirations to enter the 
UN.43 By openly expressing loyalty and support for North Korea in its fight against South Korea 
and the US troops, China could risk the possibility for admission to the UN.  
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All these reason for and against the deployment of Chinese troops to Korea resulted in 
extensive discussions between the CCP’s leaders. 
 
2.3 China’s possible participation in planning the war 
Did Mao know about the plans of Kim Il Sung to attack South Korea on June 25, 1950? 
Did the Chinese leaders actively participate in the organization of the assault? To this day, it is 
not certain whether Mao Zedong and China’s leadership were informed of Kim Il Sung’s war 
plans and many scholars are still discussing this issue. Whiting mentioned that an increased 
military presence in Northeast China in mid-1950 could be evidence that the Chinese leadership 
participated in the war preparations of North Korea.44 Jun Yasuda also argued that China 
prepared itself for entering into the war long before North Korea crossed the border and that the 
leadership was strongly determined to fight a counteroffensive against the United States. In 
Yasuda’s view, for Mao, the victory over “American imperialism” was an essential prerequisite 
to complete the Chinese communist Revolution and the numerous activities to increase China’s 
military capabilities before the Korean War could also be used as evidences for China’s 
involvement. Nevertheless, Yasuda also stated that the Soviet Union was probably very well 
informed about the North Korea’s invasion plans, whereas Mao only knew the vague planning.45 
Another indicator of China’s active planning involvement, mentioned by Qiang Zhai, was 
the return of all ethnic Korean soldiers to North Korea. In May 1949 and January 1950, Kim Il 
Sung asked Mao to discharge these soldiers who had joined the army of the CCP during the Civil 
War and send them back to North Korea.46 This event was confirmed by Nie Rongzhen:  
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In January 1950 Comrade Kim Il Sung sent Kim Kwang Hyop and other comrades to China. They asked to 
transfer into North Korea 14,000 PRC soldiers of Korean origin currently serving in the PLA. Most of these 
soldiers had joined our army in Northeast China during the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese civil war. The, 
within the PLA’s Fourth Field Army (the former Northeastern Field Army), they had fought in many parts of 
China.47 
  
Therefore, approx. 12,000 Korean troops were transferred during 1949 and 1950.48 Sergei 
Goncharov and John Wilson Lewis also claimed that Mao was aware of Kim Il Sung’s war 
preparations because of the troop transfer in the month before the war, but was also not fully 
informed of the details and the timing of North Korea’s attack.49   
General Sir Anthony Farrar- Hockley also indicated that China knew about war 
preparations and that the entering of the war was planned for at least several months, as North 
Korea’s military forces were poorly equipped and insufficiently armed to fight against the US 
troops. Thus, great amounts of military supply provided by the Soviet Union were moved 
through Northeast China by railroad before the outbreak of the war. It is very unlikely that these 
deliveries were not noticed by the Chinese government. That is why General Farrar- Hockley 
stated that the Chinese leadership was aware of North Korea’s mobilization, but it does not prove 
the deployment of Chinese troops in Korea.50  
The most important event which could indicate that Mao knew about the forthcoming war 
is Mao’s visit to Moscow and the following conference with Stalin from the end of 1949 to 
February 1950. Hak-Joon Kim declared that many outstanding authorities who deal with the 
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relations between the Soviet Union and China are convinced that Stalin used this conference to 
inform Mao about his intentions and Kim Il Sung’s plans in North Korea.51  
However, many factors also speak against the theory that China was actively involved in 
the planning of the Korean War. Whiting, for example, states that the military situation of re-
equipment, political indoctrination and the non-existent training of the Chinese troops suggest 
that a military deployment had not been determined by CCP leaders before the war started. No 
evidence of intensive training or any maneuvers in order to intensify China’s readiness for war 
prior to June 1950 can be found and the majority of the troops intensively worked on the 
economic reconstruction rather than on war mobilization. Furthermore, there is hardly any 
evidence of Soviet deliveries to China, which would have been necessary for successfully 
supporting North Korea prior to China’s entry into the war in October.52 Moreover, Hao and 
Zhai mention that the only army that was available at that time was the 42nd Army of Fourth 
Field Corps which was stationed along the Yalu river border areas not for defending the Chinese 
border against US troops, but for overseeing crop-production in this part of the country. All other 
troops were intended to be used to resolve the issues of Taiwan and Tibet in the beginning of 
1950. Another indicator that the Chinese leadership was not informed was the large 
demobilization of the PLA in early 1950 when the CCP decided to reduce the troop strength in 
order to decrease their expenses, which was necessary after many years of civil war in order to 
rebuild the country.53 Thus, the CCP cut the PLA’s ground force size from 5.4 million to 4 
million in spring 1950.54 
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Furthermore, as mentioned before, the timing of the Korean War was not favorable for 
China. In the beginning of 1950 Tibet had not been conquered yet and in the border are between 
Yunnan and Burma there were still combat troops of the Guomindang fighting against the 
Communists and the industrial base of the country was destroyed because of the war against 
Japan and the Nationalists.55 Thus, it was hardly possible for Mao and the CCP leadership to 
participate in Kim Il Sung’s war preparations, as the political situation had to be stabilized again, 
the production and the daily life of the Chinese had to be restored and the whole country needed 
to heal its wounds from the previous confrontations.56 It is therefore not surprising that the CCP 
leadership made no public promise to Kim Il Sung of assisting him in his fight for the “liberation” 
of South Korea and it seems as if the People’s Republic of China did not play an essential role in 
the planning of the Korean War because of their own domestic issues.57   
In addition, Kim and Cho claim that China was not very well informed about the situation 
of North Korea at that time, as the main interest of its leaders did not lie on the Korean Peninsula. 
During the years 1945-1948, the relations between the Communist Party of China and North 
Korea were characterized by their close cooperation in the Chinese Civil War, but official 
diplomatic relations of North Korea were limited to the Soviet Union.58 After the foundation of 
the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, China and North Korea initiated the 
establishment of diplomatic ties at the ambassadorial level and in late August of 1950, the first 
Chinese ambassador Ni Zhiliang moved to North Korea.59   
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Another important fact that could play a role while answering the question, whether 
China was involved in the war preparations or not was Mao’s attitude towards a war in Korea. 
Roe argues that Mao did not agree with Kim to reunify Korea by force and he did not intend to 
be involved in the conflict between North and South Korea.60 For Mao, an immediate 
reunification of Korea imposed by military means was not an acceptable solution.61 Thus, it is 
difficult to imagine that China was actively involved in the planning of the attack on South 
Korea. The Chinese leadership knew about the North Korean wish to reunify Korea by force, but 
they were not informed about the planning of the war in detail before its outbreak in June 1950, 
in contrast to Stalin. That is why the North Vietnamese launch of the Korean War was 
completely surprising for Mao and his CCP leaders.  
 
2.4 China’s intervention  
While planning the military takeover of South Korea, Kim Il Sung realized that North 
Korea was not able to face the South Korean troops all by itself. Thus, he paid Stalin a visit in 
Moscow in March 1949 in order to discuss the possibility of a military solution to the problem of 
Korea’s unification.62  After the war broke out in June, China also knew that the support of the 
Soviet Union was essential for a successful deployment in Korea and the CCP leadership 
considered this support as the main requirement for China’s entry into the war. In February 1950, 
Beijing and Moscow formed an alliance and made the agreement that the Soviet Union would 
offer military assistance to the Chinese in case of an attack by “imperialist powers”. When Kim 
Il Sung’s troops started their attacks on the South, CCP leaders, however, could not be assured of 
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the Soviet Union’s support in the case of Korea, because the agreement only referred to a direct 
attack on the Chinese mainland.63 Mao also adopted a more reluctant attitude towards North 
Korea’s war plans and he set two conditions for providing military assistance to Korea. The first 
one was that China would send troops to North Korea’s defense when it would be attacked, but 
not actively start attacks on South Korea and the second condition referred to China’s 
reunification with Taiwan. Thus, he advised North Korea to improve its military strength and the 
economic situation of the country first, before the leadership should think about a reunification.64  
However, Mao’s opinion and his arguments did not restrain Kim Il Sung from launching 
the war on June 25, 1950. When the North Korean troops crossed the frontier, no news about the 
attack was reported by Chinese newspapers or radios. The first official Chinese statement about 
the beginning of the war was made by the Chinese on June 28 when Mao gave a speech at the 
Eight Meeting of the Central People’s Government Council in which he condemned the US 
policy of invading China’s territory Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula by saying:  
Truman stated on January 5 this year that the United States would not interfere in Taiwan. Now he has proved 
his own statement to be false, and has torn to shreds all the international agreements regarding non- interference 
by the United States in the internal affairs of China. (…)There is no reason at all for US intervention in the 
internal affairs of Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam or other countries. The sympathy of the people throughout 
China, as well as of the broad mass of the people everywhere in the world, is on the side of the victims of 
aggression, the most decidedly not on the side of US imperialism. The people will neither be bought by 
imperialism nor cowed by it. Imperialism is outwardly strong but feeble within, because it has no support among 
the people. People throughout China and the world! Unite and prepare fully to defeat any provocation by US 
imperialism.65 
 
The Chinese government, however, restrained itself, apparently because they wanted to avoid 
any assurance of help to North Korea in the initial period of the Korean War.66 Mao Zedong, 
however, promised Kim Il Sung that China would send military forces in order to support North 
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Korea if the United States intervened in the military conflict. At the same time he was careful 
and avoided any provocative statements on the Korean War itself.67 On June 30, 1950 the 
Chinese leadership sent a team of military experts to North Korea in order to assess the situation 
and to prepare for a possible deployment as China was extremely concerned about the protection 
of the Yalu River Bridge which was the fundamental basis for transportation and communication 
and the boundary to the Chinese mainland. A crossing of this river by US troops would mean a 
direct attack on China and had to be prevented.68 Thus, a national security meeting was held on 
July 7 and China’s leaders agreed that the border defense between China and North Korea had to 
be reinforced.  As a consequence, troops of the Fourth Field Army, which was the most 
experienced combat force of the CCP, as they had fought successfully in both the anti- Japanese 
war and the civil war, were sent to the Sino- Korean border.69 On July 18, 1950, Mao stated that 
the Military Commission of the Communist Party Central Committee approved the dispatch of 
observation teams to North Korea:  
The Military Commission of the Communist Party Central Committee generally agrees with you to organize 
observation groups to the frontline of North Korea to conduct on-the-spot investigations. However, we have to 
wait until the ministry of foreign affairs negotiates with the North Korea’s ambassador. Furthermore, we have to 
consider the time and avoid revealing our objectives in an over-hasty way. The right time will be determined by 
the Military Commission of the Communist Party Central Committee.70 
 
Furthermore, the CCP’s leadership took additional measures to strengthen China’s defense, such 
as the fortifying its air force and coastal protection. When the Korean War broke out, the first 
Chinese pilots were also trained under Soviet advisers and in addition, they took precautionary 
measures to increase the safety of the border between China and Vietnam, because at that time 
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Ho Chi Minh and his troops were fighting for independence against France and planned an 
offensive campaign in this area.71 On August 5, the Central Military Commission sent an urgent 
cable and ordered the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army (NFDA) to become combat ready and 
on August 13, a commanders meeting was held by the Northeast Military Region in Shenyang.72 
Thus, the NFDA was reorganized in order to meet any emergencies in Korea and the People’s 
Liberation Army was ordered to keep intensive surveillance over China’s coast.73 These 
measures were not hidden in front of American authorities, as they thought that China intended 
to prepare 250,000 soldiers for Korea in a meeting of Chinese high-level authorities on August 
14.74 On August 27, the CCP’s leadership suddenly accused the United States of sending planes 
over the Chinese mainland. Washington immediately offered compensation and admitted a 
possible “mistake”, but this incident further increased the tensions between China and the United 
States. As a consequence, domestic protests and a wave of mass rallies characterized by anti- 
American propaganda which was further inflamed by the Chinese communist press in order to 
mobilize against the United States and to build support among the population for the war arose 
throughout the country.75 However, China addressed this challenge to its borders through 
diplomacy, such as the demand on the UN Security Council and UN secretary general by Zhou 
Enlai in late August to condemn the US military action in Korea, as China promoted peaceful 
meditation of this conflict and the withdrawal of all foreign troops.76 Nevertheless, these efforts 
failed and in the beginning of late September, the number of Chinese aggressive statements 
towards the United States increased.77 In a statement which was released on September 5, the 
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determination to fight against the US troops was expressed by the words: “We, Chinese people 
are used to hold the weapon; our wish is not to fight, but you surely want to fight. Then we have 
to let you fight.”78 Zhou Enlai also expressed this determination at a meeting on September 30, 
1950: “the Chinese people profoundly love peace, but they never have been, and never will be, 
afraid to fight back against aggression in order to defend peace. They will not tolerate aggression 
against themselves or their neighbours.”79 Zhihua Shen argues that the Chinese leadership 
assumed that the US troops would land in Inchon, which was occupied by North Korean troops. 
Thus, they decided that three measures should be taken before this landing. First, it was 
necessary to increase the war preparations made by the Northeast China Border Defense Army 
and to get combat-ready at any time. Second, they informed the North Korean leadership that the 
Korean People’s Army needed to be prepared for the worst possible case when the US troops 
would land in Inchon and lastly, the Chinese leadership ordered the Headquarters of General 
Staff and Foreign Ministry to closely observe the developments in the war.80  
Although China’s leadership did expect the United States to land in Inchon, Roe claims 
that historical evidence suggests that the timing of the landing was surprising for them.81 On 
September 15, the US troops landed and occupied Inchon, whereupon North Korea called for 
help, as its troops were attacked both front and rear by the US troops after the successful 
recapture of Inchon.82 The resulting atmosphere among the Chinese comrades at that time was 
described by Lieutenant General Du Ping: “The next day, as soon as I walked into the 
headquarters’ office, I heard my comrades’ loud discussion, with everybody eager to put in a 
word: ‘The American forces have landed at Inchon. What are we going to do?’ I did not answer 
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their question but said to myself that we were not too far away from the day we would enter the 
war.”83 As a consequence, two days later, on September 17, China sent a team of military 
advisors and five additional military attachés to North Korea.84 Furthermore, the Chinese 
government started to send warning signals to the United States. In July, 1950, the Chinese 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai had already declared that the Chinese would enter the war if US 
troops crossed the 38th parallel.85 When the Third Division of the South Korean army crossed 
the 38th parallel on September 30, 1950, Zhou Enlai released another public warning and one 
day later, Kim Il Sung asked Mao for support because of North Korea’s critical situation.86 The 
Chinese entry into the Korean War was a highly discussed topic among the CCP leaders right 
before the final decision was made by Mao. This discussion among the Chinese leadership was 
described by Marshal Nie Rongzhen:  
As we publicly criticized the American imperialists' invasion, some of our comrades were scared. They believed 
that it would be disastrous if we fought a war against the United States, the strongest imperialist nation in the 
world. […] At the same time, some dissenting opinions emerged among our leading party members. They 
mainly argued that, having fought wars for so many years, we had an urgent need to recuperate and rebuild. Our 
new republic had just been founded in the previous year and was facing many difficulties and challenges. It 
would be better not to fight this war as long as it was not absolutely necessary. 87  
 
Jian Chen, however, mentions that Mao did believe that the Korean War would not be a long war 
for China to be involved in, as Kim Il Sung tried to convince Stalin and Mao that the war would 
be short in order to receive the badly needed support.88 On October 2, Mao was convinced that 
China had to enter the war and he decided to send troops to North Korea after General 
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MacArthur declared one day earlier that all North Korean forces should surrender.89 In an 
official statement, Mao declared:  
We decided to send volunteers under the name of the first military troops to the North Korean interior in order to 
fight against the United States as well as their stooge Syngman Rhee and to help the North Korean comrades. We 
think these actions are necessary, because if we allow the United States to occupy the entire North Korean 
territory and the strength of the Korean revolution suffer a fundamental failure, then the American aggressors 
will be rampant and the entire East will be harmed.90  
 
 
In a conversation with the Indian ambassador Kavalam Madhava Panikkar on the same day, 
Zhou Enlai said:  
 
The US army is trying to cross the 38th parallel and to expand the war. If the US troops really do as I said, we 
cannot sit still and watch, we have to care.  (…) We advocate a peaceful solution; we treat the Korean issue as a 
localized event. We still advocate this until now. I also explained the attitude of our government in the report of 
October, 1st. We want peace and build up our country in peace. (…) The Korean War has to stop immediately 
and the foreign troops have to retreat in order to benefit the peace in the East. The idea of the Korean issue as a 
localized event caused the aggression of the US troops to extend and to become a global issue.91 
 
 
Thomas Christensen argues that the crossing of the 38th parallel by US forces on October 7 was 
the final catalyst which determined China’s interference in the events of the war.92 However, the 
question of support from the Soviet Union was still unanswered. Thus, Zhou Enlai took an 
emergency trip to Moscow from October 8- October 18, 1950 in order to talk about possible 
assistance. During this visit, Stalin promised to provide China military supply and aid, such as 
several regiments of anti-aircraft artillery in order to defend Manchuria, a number of interceptors, 
a ground-based air intercept radar system and the use of Russian air space above the Yalu River, 
but Stalin was not willing to provide air cover for the Chinese troops in Korea, as he did not want 
to be actively involved in the war so as to prevent a direct military confrontation between the 
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United States and the Soviet Union.93 This decision, however, launched the debate about China’s 
entry into the war in Beijing again, as top political leaders and also several military leaders 
disapproved of an intervention without sufficient air cover. They were aware that the Chinese 
military was inferior to the strong firepower of the US troops and they feared that a war against 
the United States in Korea might spread to China and destroy its industrial base and therefore 
prevent it from modernization,94 as Nie Rongzhen states that “some of the comrades, however, 
worried about whether we could achieve a victory in a war with the US Army. The enemy had 
modern weapons and technology, many times more artillery pieces than we did, and they 
enjoyed air and naval superiority. They also possessed nuclear bombs.”95 Thus, the majority of 
the top leaders opposed an intervention in Korea except for the military leaders Nie Rongzhen 
and Peng Dehuai as well as Mao himself. Peng Dehuai emphasized his opinion by saying:  
I kept thinking and thinking about the war situation in Korea. America occupied Korea across the [Yalu] River, 
threatening Northeast China. It also controlled Taiwan, threatening Shanghai and East China. It could launch a 
war to invade China with any excuse anytime it wanted. The tiger always eats people, and the time when it wants 
to eat depends on its appetite. It is impossible to make any concessions to a tiger. Since America came to invade 
us, we had to resist its invasion. It would be very difficult for us to build up our Socialist country without 
challenging the American imperialists.96  
 
Mao was concerned about the historical and geopolitical factors, but he also did not intend to let 
the scale of the war to get out of hand.97 Mao had already announced the weaknesses of the 
American troops in the beginning of September 1950. In his opinion, their battlefront from 
Germany to Korea was clearly too long and the transport routes, which included the Atlantic and 
Pacific Ocean, were too far to effectively fight a war. Furthermore, Mao was convinced that the 
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combat effectiveness of the US troops was too weak. All these points could make the US troops 
vulnerable and could be used by the Chinese for their own advantage in the fight.98  
Although the Chinese government issued several warnings, General MacArthur did not 
take these warnings seriously and he was convinced that the UN air forces could prevent the 
Chinese troops from crossing the Yalu River.99 This, however, was a wrong assumption, as Mao 
made his final decision to intervene on October 13, 1950.100  Mao decided to send Chinese troops 
under the name of Chinese People’s Volunteers, whose formation he had already proclaimed on 
October, 8, to Korea.101 The term “Volunteers” was chosen with mindful consideration by Mao 
in order to avoid a formal declaration of war.102 Although Stalin had indicated that he would not 
adhere to an agreement to support a Chinese ground war with Soviet air power, Mao decided to 
send the Chinese People’s Volunteers to Korea even without air support from the Soviet Union 
because he was convinced that the US troops also had essential weaknesses, such as their lack of 
political motivation.103 Stalin’s refusal to send his air force became a major problem for China’s 
government, as expressed in a telegram of Mao to Zhou Enlai:  
The first important questions are: 1. is the Soviet Union really able to send the desired air force to the front and 
the air force which should cover each big city at the home front within two months. 2. Does the Soviet Union 
permit the help of our planes, tanks, artillery pieces as well as their military equipment and are we allowed to 
lease all this to not exceed our budget?104  
 
Although the Chinese People’s Volunteers had been established prior to China’s entry into the 
conflict, the question of who would command China’s war in Korea had not been answered and 
needed to be clarified urgently. Lin Biao had originally been selected for the position by Mao, 
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but Lin Biao “opposed sending our troops to Korea. At first, Mao had chosen Lin to command 
the CPVF in Korea, but Lin was so fearful of this task that he gave the excuse of illness and 
obstinately refused to go to Korea.”105 Therefore, Mao offered Peng Dehuai the position as 
commander for Korea. Touched by the strong willingness of China to face the superior American 
troops, Stalin changed his mind and approved the provision of 16 air regiments of fighter planes 
for China on October 14 and thereupon, the Chinese People’s Volunteers crossed the Yalu 
unannounced and undetected between October 14 and October 16, 1950, marking the Chinese 
entry into the Korean War and immediately changed the power balance on the battlefield  
because it increased the risk for an escalation of the war into a worldwide war.106 In another 
telegram to Zhou Enlai, Mao expressed his tactical plans to enter North Korea:  
Now the US army remains at the 38th parallel. In order to attack Pyongyang they will need some time and when 
they pass through Pyongyang and attack Dezhou, they also need time. If the US troops do not attack Dezhou, the 
puppet army of Wonsan will estimate that it is also hard to attack alone. This gives our troops the time to enter 
and organize a defense. It is decided that our troops will start moving on October, 19. The vanguard has to march 
200 kilometer to Dezhou in seven days, and then they can rest for one to two days and arrive in Dezhou on 
October, 28 and they can start with construction works on the route from Ningyuan to the Southern regions. The 
entire army of 260,000 men will need ten days for crossing the Yalu River. Even if they arrive on October, 28, 
they can still completely cross the river (…) During the time when our troops start half of the construction works, 
the Korean People’s Army will still continue to resist and as far as possible delaying the beneficial advance of 
both the US army and the puppet army.107 
 
Goncharov and Lewis argue that the Korean War was considered to be a revolutionary war by 
Mao, in which the communist parties of China and North Korea were fighting together for 
liberation against the American imperialists.108 Thus, the slogan of the Chinese war in Korea was: 
“resist U.S. aggression, aid Korea, and protect our homeland”109 and the troops were told that 
they were fighting an anti-aggressive war for internationalism. Such slogans dominated the 
Chinese propaganda during wartime and the people were called to intensively support the 
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troops.110 However, in the beginning China’s intervention was cautious, defensive and 
characterized by concealed military movements of the troops in order to avoid a counterattack by 
the United States because the Chinese leadership was more concerned about China’s physical 
security.111 Peng Dehuai described his first days and the secret entry as following: “At dusk on 
October 18, 1950, I crossed the Yalu River with the first group of the advance troops of the 
Chinese People’s Volunteers Force. The next morning we reached the power station at Raekosao, 
and on October 19 we arrived at a small valley northwest of Puckchin.”112 This secrecy was 
further expressed in an order of Mao to the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army on October 18, 
1950:  
Two armies as well as three artillery regiments decide to enter the North Korean War according to predetermined 
plans and will obviously start to cross the Yalu River between Andong and Ji’an in 19 days. In order to maintain 
strict secrecy, all troops will start crossing the river every day by dusk until dawn and stop at 4 o’clock. Before 5 
o’clock they have to be concealed completely and have to conscientiously examine. In order to gain experience, 
it is intended that two to three troops will cross the river on the first day (the 19th). On the second day the 
number of troops will either be further increased or reduced and the situation will be deliberated once again, if 
the remaining troops will pass through Gaogang.113  
 
Furthermore, Mao adopted the tactic of surprise, as he was aware that the United States did not 
expect a Chinese intervention into the war.114 The Chinese People’s Volunteers were not only 
combat forces, but were also responsible for logistical supply and they supported North Korea in 
manpower transportation, railroad and highway construction, as well as in warehouse keeping.115 
China’s air force had to observe and secure the transportation corridors and restoration work on 
the airfields.116 Mao’s initial idea was to establish a defensive line between Wonsan and North 
Korea’s capital Pyongyang; however, in the first month of the war he decided to change his plan 
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and to order his troops to undertake more offensive actions.117 The battles of the Chinese troops 
were divided into 5 major campaigns. The first campaign took place from October 25 to 
November 5. The second campaign was conducted between November 24 and December 24. In 
the beginning of the New Year from December 31 to January 8, the third campaign was launched. 
Between January 25 and April 21 the troops implement the fourth campaign and the last 
campaign began on April 22 and ended on June 10.118 In the second campaign, China’s troops 
began an efficient counteroffensive which led to a retreat of the UN forces. Their combat tactics 
consisted of pretending “that we were weak so as to let the enemy advance, make them 
overconfident, and lure them in deep”119 and by following Mao’s advice to adopt surprise as “the 
combat tactic that guaranteed our victory in the Second Campaign. There was no better way to 
win it,”120  as explained by Peng Dehuai. This initial success after the invasion of Chinese troops 
caused Mao to believe that he had overestimated the force of the US military and that the United 
States were not even as strong as the Nationalists during the Civil War. Stalin was also very 
impressed by China’s initial success and called on the Chinese People’s Volunteers to launch 
another operation as long as the UN forces were still forced back in order to expel them from 
Korea. Thus, the commanders of the Chinese People’s Volunteers were pressured by China, 
North Korea and Russia to quickly and successfully win this war.121  
In their second campaign, the Chinese troops could celebrate a great victory, as they 
occupied Pyongyang on December 6 and within two weeks the offensive conducted by the Sino- 
North Korean troops liberated North Korea from the UN troops. They continued their advance 
and by the end of December, the combined communist troops of China and North Korea were 
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about to occupy Seoul.122 With the start of the third campaign on December 31, 1950, the fall of 
Seoul could not be prevented and the troops entered the city on January 4, 1951,123 which was 
summarized by Peng Dehuai: “On New Year’s Eve 1951 (the evening of December 31, 1950), 
we broke the [enemy] defense line along the Thirty- eighth Parallel, took over Seoul, crossed the 
Han River, and recovered Inchon Harbor, thus pushing the enemy back to the thirty-seventh 
parallel.”124 The seizure of Seoul and the crossing of the 38th parallel by the Chinese army 
evoked a feeling of invincibility among the Chinese leaders and Mao no longer insisted on 
negotiations in order to solve the conflict peacefully, but imagined a total victory because of the 
successful advance.125 In order to realize this victory, China desperately needed further Soviet 
support. Thus, Mao sent Chinese delegates to Moscow to submit a wish list to Stalin which 
included a request for additional arms supplies and construction plans for arsenals in which 
China could produce weapons. As part of the request, Mao explicitly asked for nuclear weapons, 
which showed his interest in the atomic bomb.126  
The following two offensives from the beginning of the year to May 1951 the Chinese 
troops suffered major and unexpected setbacks, even though the troops had rich combat 
experience and were flexible and mobile.127 In order to further strengthen the troops’ motivation 
and determination, Mao declared:   
The comrades of China and North Korea are closely united like brothers. They share weal and woe, and stick 
together in life and death in order to defeat the enemy together and fight to the end. The Chinese comrades have 
to regard the North Korean situation as their own situation, teach the commanders and the fighters to cherish 
every hill, every blade of grass, every river and every tree in North Korea and don’t take any property from the 
North Korean people in the same way as we see and treat our country. That is the successful political foundation. 
As long as we behave in this way, victory can finally be reached.128  
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Their problem, however, was that they had not sufficient knowledge about the strategies, the 
structure and the equipment of the US troops and therefore they suffered a military 
disadvantage.129 Two other issues, which are mentioned by Roe, were that the Chinese army had 
never fought outside of China. Thus, they were not experienced in battling in a foreign country 
and were also not prepared for the large-scale confrontations they encountered in Korea, as the 
military leadership had planned for a quick military deployment.130  The People’s Volunteers 
were not well supplied and poorly equipped, as the troops dealt with a shortage of supplies.131  
Furthermore, the Chinese soldiers were not trained in using Soviet weapons, although they were 
told to use these weapons which were promised and provided by the Soviet Union earlier.132 
Their precarious situation at that time was clearly stated in the explanations of Peng Dehuai:  
It was in the middle of the cold winter. We did not have any air support and lacked the protection of antiaircraft 
artillery. Enemy airplanes raided us every day, and their long-range guns shelled us day and night. We could not 
move at all during the daytime. Our troops did not have even a one-day break. You can imagine how tired they 
were. As our transportation lines were getting longer and longer, it became extremely difficult to get supplies to 
the front. By that time, our troops had lost almost half their men because of combat or noncombat losses. They 
badly needed a rest and to resupply in order to be ready for the next battle […] The problems were that our 
army’s technology and equipment were so backward and that enemy air and mechanized forces tried so hard to 
save their troops.133  
 
As a consequence of these problems Mao sent the Chief of General Staff Xu Xianqian to 
Moscow to purchase weapons and urgently needed material again on May 25, 1951.134  
Because of the major setbacks in the beginning of 1951, Mao and the military leaders 
decided to change their offensive plans into a “piecemeal” warfare in order to avoid further 
defeats.135 Therefore, “Chairman Mao sent a telegram instructing us that our mouths should not 
open too wide when fighting the American forces. We must adopt the tactic of ‘eating sticky 
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candy’- bite by bite.”136 By adopting a trench warfare in the summer and fall of 1951, “we began 
to carry out the chairman’s tactic of ‘biting sticky candy,’ that is, concentrating available 
manpower and firepower, constructing covert offense launching positions, and then attacking 
and eliminating one small unit of the enemy forces [each time], generally a battalion unit.”137  In 
the first half of 1952, the battles in the Korean War came to a standstill, as China and North 
Korea had taken a defensive position and also the UN forces transformed their military planning 
to a defensive posture.138 This standstill gradually led to willingness to negotiate on both sides. 
This willingness to negotiate was already discussed and in 1951 and mentioned by Nie Rongzhen:  
After our Fifth Campaign, the CCP Central Committee held a meeting in Beijing to discuss our next step. Most 
of the committee members considered it proper that our army should stop at the Thirty-eighth Parallel. They 
agreed that we should begin truce talks while continuing to fight so as to work toward a negotiated settlement. I 
concurred with the others on this idea. I believed that we had already achieved our political goal, i.e., that the 
enemy should be driven out of northern Korea.139  
 
Therefore, Mao and the Chinese government consented to solve the Korea question peacefully 
by announcing on February 14, 1952:  
From last year July on the opposing sides hold armistice negotiations in Kaesong and Panmunjeom. The 
representatives of the People’s Army of North Korea and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army give their best to 
make sure that the armistice negotiations will be successful. If the American side does not intentionally delay the 
negotiations, they should lead to an early success. From now on, the success of these negotiations is still subject 
to the sincerity of the US government to solve the Korea question peacefully. When the US government has the 
same sincerity as we have to solve the question peacefully concerning Korea, then the armistice negotiations can 
be successful.140 
 
The support and the intervention of China were essential for the progress of the war. The 
majority of the soldiers who were fighting on the North Korean side came from China and 
belonged to the People’s Volunteers. Between October 19 and November 5, 1950, Beijing sent 
six divisions to North Korea and after April 1952, China had provided additional material on a 
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large scale including 42 infantry divisions, four armored regiments and eight air force 
divisions.141 Mao’s ground forces doubled almost weekly and reached the strength of 530,000 
men in mid-1950. This number still continued to increase and one year later, the North Korean 
army was supported by 590,000 Chinese soldiers.142  
In the end, a total of 2.3 million fighting troops was sent to Korea and all in all the CCP’s 
leadership provided 15 engineering regiments, ten railway engineering divisions, two public 
security divisions, three tank divisions, 12 air force divisions, 70 artillery divisions and 25 field 
corps.143 However, Shu Guang Zhang states that the Soviet Union played the most essential role 
in assisting North Korea and consequently also in the Korean War, because they equipped not 
only North Korean soldiers, but also the Chinese People’s Volunteers without actively 
intervening in the events of the war.144 Bruce Cumings, however, claims that China’s influence 
was superior in North Korea to the influence of the Soviet Union and that the North Korean army 
combined Chinese communist warfare and Soviet tactics, whereas Shen argues that it was 
impossible for China to fight a modern war entirely on its own. Therefore, the Chinese 
leadership relied on the Soviet assistance for both weaponry and military equipment.145  
Chinese and North Korean representatives, and US and UN delegates met at Keasong on 
July 10, 1951 in order to talk about a possible armistice and its conditions.146 For Mao and Stalin, 
however, an armistice was totally unacceptable. After Stalin’s death, the new Soviet leadership 
with Nikita Chruschtschow was willing to talk about a truce, whereas Mao maintained his 
reluctant attitude toward peace negotiations. This disagreement also contributed to the 
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subsequent alienation between China and the Soviet Union.147 The battles in Korea ended with 
the agreement on July 27, 1953 in which it was stated that:  
A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as 
to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a 
buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities. (…) Neither 
side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone. (…) and civil administration 
and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the 
joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese 
People's Volunteers.148 
 
The Chinese People’s Volunteers, however, still stayed until 1958 in North Korea in order to 
provide reconstruction assistance in the post- war era.149  
 
2.5 Outcomes of the war  
The Chinese intervention had essentially influenced the course of the Korea War, as it 
prevented the UN troops from fulfilling their objectives of unifying Korea. B.C. Koh and other 
scholars claim that the military conflict between North and South Korea was also the beginning 
of a deep Chinese-North Korean friendship based on shared ideological ties, because the North 
Korean leadership was very impressed by the Chinese military assistance during the Korean War 
and regarded China as their rescuer who guaranteed North Korea’s survival.150 China greatly 
contributed to the victories against the US troops and to the protection of North Korea as the 
Chinese government had sent several hundred thousand soldiers to Korea between mid- October 
1950 and mid-January 1951. This huge concentration of military personnel in such a short time is 
remarkable and could also be used as evidence that the deployment in the war had already been 
planned and prepared over many months, even before the war began.151 Although China lost 
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many soldiers, Mao considered the war to be a success and victory for the nation. In his opinion, 
the interference strengthened China’s security and defense.152 The Korean War was officially 
celebrated by Mao and the CCP leadership as a great success and a victory over the threat of US 
imperialism. The delight of this victory was emphasized in a telegram of the Central Committee 
and the Military Commission on October 24, 1952:  
Our volunteer troops cooperated with the People’s Army since September, 18th and started a tactical 
counterattack on all fronts. Within one month, they destroyed and wounded more than 30,000 enemy soldiers 
and gained important victories. The Central Committee and the Military Commission express warm 
congratulations to you as well as to all commanders and soldiers.153  
 
Peng Dehuai was also strongly convinced that the outcome of the Korean War was very 
successful for China, as he said: “Our success reflected the integrity of our revolutionary army’s 
superior political and military qualities and created favorable conditions for our protracted 
positional warfare in Korea.”154 In a speech of Mao Zedong on the 24th conference of the 
Central People's Government Committee in 1953, Mao explained the reasons of the successful 
outcome of the war for China. In his opinion, the mindset of the soldiers played an essential role 
in defeating the US troops. In contrast to American soldiers, the Chinese soldiers were quick-
witted, brave, with a lot of devotion and were not afraid to die for their country in the battlefield, 
whereas American soldiers were rigid and not solid. As a result of this attitude, China’s military 
could establish an impenetrable defense and by gaining experience during the battles, every 
soldier was able to grow stronger and develop himself further. Mao also quoted political and 
economic factors as reasons for the successful outcome of the war. The hostile parties had to deal 
with great contradictions between each other which hindered them from effectively fighting 
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together and their expenses in the beginning months of the war were too high. In Mao’s eyes, all 
these reasons allowed China to celebrate a great victory in the end.155   
Furthermore, China proved that it could assert its position among other Asian nations. 
The successful deployment in Korea also influenced the events in Vietnam, as Ho Chi Minh felt 
strengthened by China’s victory and reinforced his movement against the French occupation in 
Indochina. He was supported by Chinese military advisors who were sent to Vietnam between 
fall of 1953 and spring of 1954.156  
However, the war also claimed its victims. China’s entry into the war took place without 
sufficient air cover which should have been provided by the Soviet Union. As a consequence, 
American air strikes caused devastating losses among China’s troops until the end of November 
1950, when the promised Soviet air cover was approved by Stalin.157 Thus, the Chinese People’s 
Volunteers lost a total of 390,000 soldiers. These include 148,400 dead, 21,000 captured and 
4,000 missing soldiers. Furthermore, the People’s Republic of China had spent more than 6.2 
billion Renminbi for its war in Korea.158
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3. China’s involvement in the Vietnam War  
In the following section, China’s role during the Vietnam War will be illustrated by 
briefly elaborating its significance for the Vietnamese in the First Indochina War and its attitude 
towards Vietnamese reunification as a participant at the Geneva Conference. After that the thesis 
will continue with the examination of China’s possible motivations to become involved in a 
conflict between North Vietnam and the United States and will end with Chinese supportive 
measures during 1964-1975.  
The early origin of the Vietnam War can be traced back to the 19th century when the 
French occupied Indochina and imposed their colonial rule on Vietnam. As a consequence 
national resistance to this colonial rule and its masters was formed. During World War II, 
however, Vietnam was occupied by Japan and became a Japanese colony between 1941 and 
1945. Under these circumstances, the national resistance movement remained and was now not 
only directed against French colonialism, but also against Japanese imperialism. In 1941, the 
“League for the Independence of Vietnam”, also known as the Viet Minh, was founded by Ho 
Chi Minh in order to fight for an independent Vietnam.  
After World War II and the defeat of Japan, France was determined to reclaim Vietnam 
as its colony and this wish eventually resulted in the outbreak of the First Indochina War 
between France and the Viet Minh. China had already played an essential role in the First 
Indochina War, as it provided military advisors and weapons to Ho Chi Minh and his troops.  In 
1950, Mao and Liu Shaoqi agreed that Vietnam needed China’s support in its fight of 
independence against France. By sharing experiences, advisors and sending military and 
economic assistance, the Chinese leadership provided essential aid during the First Indochina 
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War.1 After the Korean War, however, the situation changed and Zhou Enlai had to refuse 
further assistance to Ho Chi Minh because of China’s high losses in the war. At that time, China 
had to face numerous domestic problems, such as economic reconstruction and the recovery 
from the Korean War. Therefore, the government was not in a position to support Vietnam in 
their fight for independence.2 
In 1954, the First Indochina War ended with the defeat of the French troops and marked 
also the end of French colonial rule in Indochina. The subsequent Geneva Conference confirmed 
the independence of Vietnam, but also resulted in the division of the country, whereupon the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam under the communist government of Ho Chi Minh was 
established in the North and the Republic of Vietnam under the Western-oriented leadership of 
Ngo Dinh Diem was set up in the South.   
The Vietnam War, or Second Indochina War, started in 1964 with the Gulf of Tonkin 
Incident, when soldiers of the North Vietnamese navy ostensibly opened fire on American 
warships. As a consequence, US president Johnson immediately ordered military intervention to 
support South Vietnam. The American intervention in Vietnam, however, also prompted China 
to participate in this war as an ally of North Vietnam. Although the United States fought a 
systematic air war against North Vietnam and deployed a large amount of ground forces in the 
South, the US government realized that the war could not be won. Without a prospect of a 
successful outcome of the war, the United States was willing to negotiate. In 1969, peace 
negotiations in Paris began and the final armistice agreement was signed four years later in 1973 
which, however, did not mean the end of the conflict between North and South Vietnam, but the 
withdrawal of all American forces. The war in Vietnam continued after the Paris Peace Accords 
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and in 1975, Saigon was successfully seized by the North Vietnamese troops. South Vietnam had 
to unconditionally surrender and Vietnam was reunited one year later as the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam.   
Similar to the Korean War, China’s assistance was also extremely crucial in the case of 
Vietnam. Another communist ally in Asia asked China for help in its fight against US troops 
more than ten years after Korea and the Chinese government was willing to provide substantial 
aid. In Vietnam, however, China’s intervention and its nature of support differed from their 
military deployment in Korea, which will be illustrated in the following.  
 
3.1 China at the Geneva Conference in 1954  
The Geneva Conference, which began on April 26, 1954, marked an important point in 
the Vietnamese independence movement and was initiated by the Soviet Union in order to bring 
an end to the military confrontations between France and the Viet Minh and to reduce 
international tensions after the Korean War.3 The purpose of this conference was the negotiation 
of the armistice between France and its former colony Vietnam; however, the participants not 
only included France and its former colonies Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, but also Great 
Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China.4 As a result of the resolutions passed 
during this conference, Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel and the participants also 
determined the retreat of the Viet Minh to North Vietnam and the withdrawal of the French 
troops until July 1956. Furthermore, general elections, which would reunite the nation under one 
government again, were to be held in the same month. In addition, France had to declare the 
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independence of Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.5 As the Geneva Accords determined the division 
of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese party leadership were reluctant to sign the 
agreement. Zhou Enlai, however, finally convinced them to sign the Final Declaration of the 
conference in order to ensure a peaceful environment for China’s reconstruction in Asia, 
although the CCP’s leadership did not believe in a possible reunification by elections.6 China 
needed this restored peace in Southeast, as it had to deal with domestic problems such as the 
introduction of the first Five- Year Plan and the liberation of Taiwan. Therefore, the participation 
in the Geneva Conference was very essential for China.7 The Chinese delegation of the newly 
founded People’s Republic could also use the conference for representing its influential status as 
a power among other nations and to increase its reputation after the Korean War.8 Although 
North Vietnam supported the idea of a reunification with the South, the Chinese leadership was 
afraid that the United States would intervene in Indochina after the conquest of South Vietnam.9 
Thus, Mao and other leaders suggested that North Vietnam should rather concern itself with the 
Socialist revolution and the reconstruction of the North, instead of focusing on reunification.10 
China believed that the Vietnamese Communists should make sure that the revolutionary 
achievements they had reached in North Vietnam would be consolidated by combining the 
military struggle with political struggle.11 This attitude of China, however, changed in the early 
1960s, because the Chinese leaders had to admit that they rather favored a reunited Vietnam than 
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a South Vietnam with a strong military presence of the United States.12 The Chinese government 
wanted to prevent increasing influence of the United States in Southeast Asia, as they still 
remembered the military confrontations of the Korean War and their consequences.13 Therefore, 
China adopted a policy of peaceful coexistence in hopes of undermining the connection between 
the USA and the non- communist countries of Southeast Asia.14 
After the Geneva Accords, North Vietnam became primarily concerned with national 
reunification and the enforcement of a communist domination in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the 
leadership of the Vietnamese Communists consulted China in order to discuss which strategy 
should be applied to unify Vietnam.15 China, however, wanted to avoid any further intervention 
of the United States in Asia and recommended that the North Vietnamese wait for some time, 
collect strength and take advantage of the right opportunity to fight for a reunited Vietnam.16 
After the Geneva Conference the Chinese government assured Ho Chi Minh of providing 
assistance in implementing the agreement in the following telegram on July 23, 1954:  
(…) At the Geneva Conference the delegation from the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam represented the hopes 
for peace of the Vietnamese people who had struggled heroically for national independence and freedom and had 
already attained glorious victories, and worked hard for the restoration of the peace of Indochina, and finally 
achieved an agreement. This is yet another great victory for the Vietnamese people. This victory is helpful in 
promoting collective peace and security in Asia and is beneficial to furthering the relaxation of the tension in the 
international situation. All the people of China will strive together with the people of Viet Nam to assure and 
attain the thorough implementation of the Agreement and to preserve and consolidate the peace and security of 
Asia and the world.17  
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3.2 China’s reasons to enter the war 
The consequences of the Korean War such as the high number of losses restrained China 
from actively participating in the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, they did not restrain them from 
providing service teams and supplying weapons to North Vietnam. What were China’s reasons 
and motives for supporting yet another country that was at war with the United States?  
After the First Indochina War, China had already supported North Vietnam with 
economic aid, as Vietnam was in a very desolate condition after the military confrontations with 
France. In particular, the economy had to be restored, because North Vietnam seriously suffered 
from the French attacks. Numerous streets were impassable and many channels and dikes were 
destroyed and had to be rebuilt.18 Thus, North Vietnam was dependent on China’s help in the 
country’s reconstruction. Immediately after the Geneva Conference in 1954, China began to 
provide economic assistance and supply everyday goods in order to stabilize the markets in the 
cities and to prevent a widespread famine. Furthermore, China assisted North Vietnam to 
revitalize light industries and the production of handicrafts. As the North Vietnamese 
infrastructure was strongly damaged after the First Indochina War, China sent numerous laborers 
and technicians to North Vietnam who helped in the restoration of roads, highways, essential 
bridges and ports. In addition, Chinese advisory groups were sent to North Vietnam in order to 
train Vietnamese technicians and laborers.19   
These supporting measures were approved by Mao in order to prevent an American 
invasion in China, as North Vietnam functioned as a buffer state between China and South 
Vietnam as CCP leaders still considered the United States to be a threat to China’s national 
security. In 1964, however, the American military presence in South Vietnam increased and 
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further alarmed the CCP leadership. Zhai states that Mao believed the United States intended to 
occupy Taiwan and to make South Vietnam and South Korea into its colonies by expanding their 
military presence.20  Thus, Mao decided to take further precautionary measures against this threat 
by preparing the Chinese people for war and supporting North Vietnam in their military struggle, 
as he regarded military aid as the only way of opposing the containment of China by the United 
States.21 
Another crucial argument mentioned by Zhai was Mao’s commitment to national 
liberation movements all around the world. In Mao’s eyes, all 3rd World countries which fought 
for their national liberation were potential allies in his fight against imperialism. Furthermore he 
regarded China as the leader of all these 3rd World countries in their struggle for independence, 
as China had already experienced a successful revolution and therefore, functioned as a model 
for all liberation movements in Asia, Latin America and Africa.22 As early as mid-1949, Mao 
determined that Chinese foreign policy would be characterized by the fight against imperialism 
and the cooperation with the Soviet Union.23 These guidelines were emphasized in a statement 
by Foreign Minister Chen Yi issued in Beijing on September 20, 1958:  
Should the U.S. aggressors, despite the repeated warnings of the Chinese people and the firm opposition of the 
people of the world, dare to impose war on us, our 600 million people, united as one, will certainly spare no 
sacrifice and will, under the sacred banner of defending our great motherland, fight against aggression, fight for 
the preservation of our sovereignty and territorial integrity, and fight for the safe-guarding of peace in the Far 
East and the world! Ours is a just struggle. With the help of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and 
with the sympathy and support of all the peace-loving countries and people of Asia, Africa and the rest of the 
world, we will certainly win complete victory.24  
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Therefore, the Chinese government openly promoted the provision of aid to all Southeast Asian 
people who were struggling against US imperialism and viewed their support of North Vietnam 
as a duty in order to carry out an Asia-wide socialist revolution that would be followed by the 
worldwide socialist revolution.25 Thus, Mao said in 1963:  
In their just patriotic struggle against U.S. imperialism and the Diem clique the people of southern Vietnam have 
won major victories both politically and militarily. We the Chinese people firmly support their just struggle. I am 
convinced that through struggle they will attain the goal of liberating the southern part of Vietnam and contribute 
to the peaceful reunification of their fatherland. It is my hope that the working class, the revolutionary people 
and progressives throughout the world will all stand by the people of southern Vietnam and, in response to 
President Ho Chi Minh’s call, support the just struggle of the heroic people of southern Vietnam and oppose 
aggression and oppression by the counter-revolutionary U.S.-Diem clique, and thus help the people there save 
themselves from slaughter and achieve complete liberation.26 
 
Zhai and many other scholars argue that another reason for China to assist North Vietnam in the 
war was the increasing Chinese criticism of Soviet revisionism. In the years following the 
foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin 
supported China in the construction of centrally planned economy. After the death of Stalin, 
however, the ties between China and Soviet Union suffered from the change of leadership and 
the struggle between Nikita Chruschtschow, Stalin’s successor and Mao Zedong for the 
leadership claim of the communist movement led to a split between the parties.27 China’s leaders 
developed their own idea about the way to Socialism and began to dissociate themselves from 
the Soviet Union. Xiaoming Zhang claims that this increasing competition for the leadership of 
the communist movement also played a part in contributing to China’s reasons to intervene in the 
Vietnam War, as each rival party needed supporters in this ideological dispute and tried to win 
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the fellowship of North Vietnam.28 As a result, Chinese foreign policy regarding North Vietnam 
and the war was of great strategic significance.29 Supporting North Vietnam in their war would 
allow China to gain more influence within the communist bloc, to separate itself from the Soviet 
Union and to restrict the growing Soviet influence in Vietnam.30    
In addition, Zhai mentions that Mao was concerned with the development of the Chinese 
revolution and the question of a potential successor in the first half of the 1960s. He believed that 
China could fall into the hands of revisionists who follow the leadership given by the Soviet 
Union after his death. However, Mao realized that he could take advantage of the US aggression 
in Vietnam in order to prevent a takeover by Soviet-like revisionists by reinforcing anti-
imperialist feelings and mobilizing the population against revisionists within China, which also 
served as the preparation for the Cultural Revolution.31 This was another reason which prompted 
Mao to provide military aid to North Vietnam during the war. 
 
3.3 China’s support during the Second Indochina War 
In the summer of 1955, the Chinese government decided to send their military advisors in 
North Vietnam back to China. However, in order to further support North Vietnam in their 
modernization process, military specialists were ordered to replace the former advisors.32 In 1956, 
China and North Vietnam signed an agreement which stated that China would also assist North 
Vietnam in recovering the economy by sending additional specialists which were trained in 
miscellaneous fields.33 However, the Chinese government did not encourage Ho Chi Minh to use 
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violence to reunite Vietnam. On September 25, 1956, China’s vice premier Chen Yi reinforced 
this attitude against military confrontations in his report on foreign policy in which he stated that 
China would reject all kinds of conflicts, as it needed a peaceful environment in its efforts to 
become a socialist, flourishing and industrialized nation. This international peace would be 
ensured through the solidarity and cooperation amongst the nations of the socialist camp.34 This 
attitude of China had already been reinforced by Mao in a talk with representatives of Britain’s 
Labor Party two years earlier on August 24, 1954:  
In the past we had problems with the Japanese, now we have problems with the Americans. Between us and the 
United States there is an ocean, called the Pacific Ocean, but the Pacific Ocean is not pacific at all. (…) China is 
an agricultural country. We will need several decades to change into an industrialized country and we also need 
assistance to do so in every field. At first, we need a peaceful environment. To constantly fight wars is not a 
good method and to train many soldiers can impede the economic development. If everyone here agrees with my 
words, then we all should continue to create a peaceful international environment. (…) This also includes the 
United States, as I hope that the United States will also adopt a peaceful policy of co-existence. If such a big 
country as the United States does not want peace, we must not stay calm; everyone should also not stay calm.35  
 
China agreed to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with any government in the world, as 
long as they adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.36 These Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence were determined in 1954 between China and India and consisted of: 
“mutual respect of each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, 
mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
co-existence.”37 As Mao and other CCP leaders opposed a military unification with South 
Vietnam, they tried to further convince North Vietnam to call for a dialogue between the two 
parts.38  In 1958, Ho Chi Minh visited China and met with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in 
order to talk about prospective measures and the way China could help North Vietnam in their 
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fight against the United States and a possible unification with South Vietnam. China’s position 
and its reluctant attitude towards the conquest of the South, however, did not change, as they still 
considered the realization and implementation of the socialist revolution in North Vietnam as the 
most fundamental task.39  Nevertheless, China was willing to train and equip North Vietnamese 
soldiers after these meetings in 1958. In addition, the Chinese government provided 50 000 
Soviet-designed AK-47 assault rifles in order to strengthen North Vietnam’s defense in case of 
an American attack.40  One year later, China’s attitude towards a Vietnamese reunification 
changed. In August 1959, Ho Chi Minh was assured that the Chinese government would provide 
further military aid for the communist struggle in South Vietnam, as Mao decided that the fight 
against imperialism would be more effective than peaceful negotiations.41 As a consequence, the 
CCP leaders promised Ho Chi Minh after his request to send a sufficient amount of weapons to 
equip 230 battalions when he visited China again in 1962 and in summer of the same year the 
Chinese supply of 90,000 guns of all types arrived in North Vietnam.42 In late 1962 and early 
1963, the Chinese policy toward Vietnam became more radical.43 The Vietnamese Communists 
also began to be concerned about a possible US invasion in North Vietnam, as the United States 
intensified their military intervention and their involvement between 1963 and 1964.44 In order to 
face this American threat, a meeting between Zhou Enlai and leaders of the Vietnam Workers 
Party, the Lao People’s Party and the Indonesian Communist Party was convened in 1963. At 
this meeting, Zhou Enlai emphasized the idea of a mutual anti-feudalist, anti-imperialist and anti-
capitalist revolution in Southeast Asia. In order to realize this revolution, he proposed the 
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implementation of four necessary steps. In the beginning, the mobilization of the masses and the 
expansion of the united communist front were essential, followed by the armed struggle in the 
countryside and the establishment of base areas. The third step consisted of the strengthening of 
the Communist Party leadership. After all these measures were taken in each country, it would 
be important to increase contact with other communist parties and assist each of these parties in 
their struggle against imperialism and capitalism.  As the fear of a US attack increased, the 
Chinese government agreed in December 1963 to send combat troops to North Vietnam if US 
troops crossed the 17th parallel.45 This agreement was approved again in July 1964, when the 
most important meeting before the escalation of the Vietnam War was held. At this meeting, 
communist representatives of China, Vietnam and Laos came together in Hanoi and declared 
their absolute loyalty to North Vietnam in the fight against US aggression by promising to send 
troops.46  
When North Vietnamese patrol boats started attacking a US destroyer in the Gulf of 
Tonkin in the afternoon of August 2, 1964, the White House decided to take military action 
against North Vietnam. As a consequence, President Johnson ordered air strikes against North 
Vietnamese naval bases. The Gulf of Tonkin incident also contributed to closer consultations 
between the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists about a possible military cooperation 
against the US forces. Furthermore, Mao knew how to benefit from the escalation of the Vietnam 
War by using the anti-imperialist propaganda to further radicalize China’s politics and its social 
life. As a result, numerous mass demonstrations and rallies against the US aggression in Vietnam 
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were organized all over China.47 In addition, the Chinese government decided to increase the 
military preparations in South China and the military assistance to North Vietnam. The Central 
Military Committee instructed the military regions, air force and naval units in Kunming and 
Guangzhou to prepare for combat readiness.48  In mid-August 1964, four air divisions and one 
antiaircraft division were dispatched near the Sino- Vietnamese border. The Chinese strategy 
was based on three fundamental principles. China and North Vietnam agreed on sending Chinese 
military aid if American ground forces invaded North Vietnamese territory.  
Furthermore, China repeatedly signaled its combat readiness towards the United States in 
order to prevent the expansion of the war to Chinese territory, as China’s leadership planned to 
avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States for as long as possible. Thus, China 
focused on providing logistical support and assistance in strengthening the North Vietnamese 
defense.49 Further measures were taken in August 1964 when China sent approximately 15 MIG-
15 and MIG-17 jets to North Vietnam and declared itself to be willing to train North Vietnamese 
pilots. In order to strengthen China’s defense, two additional military airfields were built in 
Guangxi and an inspection team was ordered to investigate the conditions in North Vietnam in 
case of a possible deployment of support troops. As Mao and other CCP leaders were extremely 
concerned about a direct attack on China, they suggested the construction of defensive works 
along the coastal regions to the North Vietnamese leadership and Mao even ordered the 
formation of three defensive lines around the Chinese capital Beijing and the port city Tianjin.50  
In the end of 1964, China and North Vietnam signed a military agreement for the 
deployment of 300,000 Chinese troops to North Vietnam. This agreement meant the beginning 
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of China’s direct involvement in the Vietnam War.51 In February 1965, the number of American 
air strikes against North Vietnam increased and the war escalated with the operation “Rolling 
Thunder” which was the first large air offensive against the North. As a Chinese reaction, Zhou 
Enlai asked the Pakistani president during a visit on April 2, 1965 to transmit a 4-point- message 
to the American president Johnson. The Pakistani president, however, never delivered Zhou 
Enlai’s message to the US government.52 In this message, the Chinese government made clear 
that China would not provoke a war with the United States. Furthermore, China would honor its 
international commitment of supporting national liberation movements, but was also prepared for 
any military confrontation. Thus, China would be determined to fight a war in case of an 
American attack on the Chinese mainland. In this conversation Zhou Enlai also stated:  
If the United States imposes a war on the Chinese people, they will resist to the end. There is no other way out. 
(…) Generally speaking, these three sentences are: First, China won’t take the initiative to provoke a war against 
the United States. Second, the Chinese people keep to their words. Third, China has already prepared.53 
 
Due to these devastating air strikes, Hanoi had to turn to Beijing again and ask for help. Thus, Le 
Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap visited China in early April to request the provision of Chinese 
troops.54 At a meeting with Liu Shaoqi on April 8, 1965, Le Duan expressed the North 
Vietnamese hope for China’s willingness to send voluntary pilots, engineers and military troops 
to North Vietnam so that the own troops could fight in the South.55 In response, the Chinese 
government signed several agreements in which they approved sending support troops to North 
Vietnam. Zhou Enlai, however, made it clear that these Chinese support troops should only be 
responsible for road repair and road construction.  In order to organize the support to North 
Vietnam, the “Central Committee- State Council Aid Vietnam Work Team” was established and 
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China agreed with North Vietnam that they would only actively intervene with the use of ground 
forces if the United States sent their own ground forces to directly attack the North. In the current 
situation, however, China declared that North Vietnam had to fight the war by itself.56  
Nevertheless, the Chinese support troops would be under the command of the Vietnam 
People’s Army and receive orders only from North Vietnam.57 Thus, the CCP Central 
Committee issued a directive to the party’s county and military regimental organizations on 
April 14, 1965 to increase their combat readiness in order to be prepared for a joint fight against 
the US imperialists with the Vietnamese people.58 On May 30, 1965 China signed another formal 
agreement in which they promised to send engineering troops to reconstruct North Vietnamese 
roads and connect them to the Chinese road system in order to improve transportation routes.59 
Beginning in June 1965, the Chinese government supplied North Vietnam with additional 
ground-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery. Furthermore, supplementary support troops 
consisting of railroad, engineering, mine sweeping and logistic units, crossed the border.60 The 
antiaircraft artillery was ordered to be responsible for the air defense of strategically important 
targets north of the 21st parallel and the remaining troops had to build up defense works in the 
delta regions of the Red River and along the Northeast coast. In addition, their task was to keep 
two rail supply lines between China and the North Vietnamese capital Hanoi running.61 The first 
Chinese unit that was sent to North Vietnam was named “Corps of the Chinese Rear Services” 
and was divided into three special divisions.62 The coordination of these units and the 
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transportation of materials to North Vietnam were conducted by a special leadership group 
headed by Luo Ruiqing.63  
Furthermore, the establishment of two authorities, which were exclusively responsible for 
the policies concerning Vietnam, was commanded in order to effectively use the delivered 
materials to North Vietnam. The first authority was the “Leading Group on Vietnamese Affairs” 
which should define the central strategy of the Chinese leadership, make decisions and 
suggestions about the actions in Vietnam and to investigate and decide as to whether and to what 
degree the support to North Vietnam was necessary. The second authority was named “Group in 
Charge of Supporting Vietnam under the Central Committee and the State Council” and its task 
was the coordination of the party decisions and state council concerning Vietnam.64 Mao gave 
military aid to North Vietnam the highest priority65 and Ho Chi Minh also placed great hopes in 
Beijing’s support.66 In the end of 1965, Zhou Enlai expressed China’s attitude in a conversation 
with the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry Jean Chauvel:  
We know that our Vietnamese friends think that it is not a good time to negotiate right now. Especially, they 
think that the American fraud of their so-called peace talks has to be exposed. Our attitude is clear and will also 
be the same in the future: we will support the Vietnamese position. (…) If the United States decides to expand 
the war to China, we will not hesitate to resolutely resist at all costs. If we don’t have this kind of determination, 
how could we support Vietnam, how could we oppose the American aggression and their war policy, and how 
could we shatter their global war strategy? (…) The United States let the Vietnam War escalate. Thus, the 
responsibility lies with the United States and not with other people. We are a socialist and also a neighboring 
country. We not only mentally support the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but we also offer materialist help 
which is totally necessary.67 
 
The deployment of service troops were of great importance for the Chinese government, as their 
task was to serve as role models for the Vietnamese soldiers and to represent China as an 
example of proletarian internationalism. The Chinese soldiers were also ordered to assist in the 
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training of North Vietnamese soldiers in order to prepare them to fight a war against the United 
States.68  
Beijing supplied large quantities of small weapons, ammunition and combat aircraft. In 
addition, North Vietnamese pilots were trained by Chinese pilots in conducting air strikes. 
China’s government also approved the usage of Chinese landing fields by the North Vietnamese 
air force. These landing fields, however, were not used as bases for attacking US aircraft.69 Apart 
from the military and logistical support, China also provided a large amount of everyday objects 
which were needed by the common population and the North Vietnamese army, such as 
uniforms, shoes, cigarettes, table tennis balls, hygiene products or groceries.70 In order to ensure 
the supply of all this material even to South Vietnam, a secret coastal transportation line was 
established by constructing a concealed harbor on Hainan Island, as a significant amount of 
China’s materials were directly supplied to the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. Mao 
also ordered that all aid packages which were sent to South Vietnam “must be easy to use, carry, 
disguise, and transport”, because most of it was hand-carried by women.71 Another measure to 
improve the required deliveries to North Vietnam was the formation of partner relationships 
between China’s southern provinces Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan and Hunan and the North 
Vietnamese provinces along the Sino- Vietnamese border. These partner relationships should 
ensure the adequate supply of goods for daily use, but also be a part of the production control 
and planning.72 
 In terms of military tactics, Mao and other CCP leaders drew a lesson from their 
experiences in the Korean War, as a rotation strategy for anti-aircraft artillery troops was 
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invented which proposes the deployment of one unit for six months and a following replacement 
of this unit. These units were not all sent to Vietnam at the same time, but entered in eight 
separate stages and consisted of two antiaircraft artillery divisions and one regiment in order to 
defend two essential railroad lines between Hanoi, Youyiguan and Lao Cai and to provide cover 
for the engineering troops. 73 Between June 1965 and March 1968, over 320,000 Chinese troops 
were situated in North Vietnam.74 The Chinese support and the supply of military equipment 
strongly declined in 1968, however, as the relations between China and North Vietnam 
deteriorated.75 The majority of Chinese troops left North Vietnam in 1969. In the same year, 
Beijing decided to reduce its economic and military aid to the lowest level and in July 1970, all 
Chinese troops were withdrawn from North Vietnam.76  
The tensions between Beijing and Hanoi had already emerged in the beginning of the 
Chinese intervention in the Vietnam War.77 The Chinese leadership and the North Vietnamese 
leadership often disagreed on important war decisions, such as the conduct of war and these 
disputes negatively affected Sino- Vietnamese relations.78 The North Vietnamese leadership also 
tried to reduce the Chinese influence by restraining the contact between the Chinese troops and 
the local population. At the time when the first service troops were sent, the North Vietnamese 
people mainly expressed distrust. Qiang Zhai sees the memory of the past when Vietnam was 
repeatedly subject to the domination of Imperial China as the cause for this distrust. These 
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memories evoked feelings of skepticism and suspicion within the North Vietnamese population 
toward the Chinese aid workers.79  
Chen argues that another problem for Beijing was Hanoi’s rejection of the Chinese claim 
to leadership in the region and the ideological example of Mao Zedong. Furthermore, the CCP 
leadership did not approve of Hanoi taking independent decisions without informing the Chinese 
government. In addition, the ameliorated relations between North Vietnam and the Soviet Union, 
which started developing in the mid- 1960s, contributed to a further alienation between Beijing 
and Hanoi.80 This alienation further increased through two important events, the Cultural 
Revolution, which started in 1966, and the Prague Spring, which led to the invasion of Soviet 
troops in Czechoslovakia and the suppression of the revolt. This suppression of the Prague 
Spring was regarded by North Vietnam with favor, whereas China condemned the Soviet 
intervention and these different opinions resulted in a stronger North Vietnamese orientation 
towards the Soviet Union.81 The Cultural Revolution, whose influence had also spread from 
China to parts of North Vietnam, strained the Sino- North Vietnamese relations as well. The 
North Vietnamese population feared the radical behavior of the Chinese cadres and was 
reminded of China’s conquests of the past.82  
Another disagreement which affected the relationship between China and North Vietnam 
was the attitude towards negotiations to end the war. Hanoi had already shown interest in 
negotiations with the United States early in the war. Mao and his CCP leaders, however, strongly 
opposed any form of peace negotiations at that time, as Mao still believed in the national 
liberation movement. If he approved peace talks in this early stage of the war, he could not 
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uphold China’s international position as the worldwide leader of these movements. Furthermore, 
Mao wanted to restrict the Soviet impact in Southeast Asia. He assumed that peace talks on 
Vietnam could be dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union and he wanted to avoid 
China’s isolation at these conferences and a decreasing influence in Southeast Asia. Thus, it is 
not surprising that Mao and other Chinese leaders used every opportunity to oppose the idea of 
peace talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in the years 1966 and 1967.83 In 
addition, the Chinese government tried to force North Vietnam to protract the war against the US 
troops by declaring that imperialism and revisionism had to be defeated.84 Nevertheless, the 
North Vietnamese government was not easily convinced and opened peace talks with the United 
States in 1968. 
Shortly before these peace talks began, the North Vietnamese government ordered the 
launching of the “Tet Offensive” in January 1968. The goal of this offensive was to completely 
repulse the American troops and to establish a coalition government of a united Vietnam under 
the command of the Vietcong.85 Zhai also sees in the Tet Offensive an expression of the different 
disagreements between Beijing and Hanoi, because it opposed Mao’s concept of a protracted 
people’s war. In Mao’s opinion, a people’s war consisted of three stages in which a strategic 
defense was developed in order to face the strategic offensive of the reactionary forces, followed 
by a strategic equilibrium in order to prepare for the counteroffensive and these steps would 
ultimately result in a successful attack against the hostile reactionary forces. All these struggles 
took place in the countryside and could be brought into the cities after the strategic offensive 
against the enemy. The Tet Offensive, however, did not follow the people’s war model of Mao, 
as the offensive had already focused on the urban areas long before they reached the last stage. 
                                                          
83 Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, 157;166-167. 
84 Yang, “Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars,” 83. 
85 Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, 175-176. 
62 
 
Thus, the way of the Tet Offensive challenged the idea of the revolutionary forces as the mass 
base of the struggle against imperialism, and thereby undermined Mao’s idea of a protracted 
people’s war.86 Furthermore, it also demonstrated China’s low influence on North Vietnamese 
decision- making concerning war strategies. As a consequence of the inefficient Tet Offensive, 
the Paris peace talks were opened in November 1968, resulting in the complete withdrawal of 
Chinese anti-aircraft artillery units in March 1969, as Beijing could not accept Hanoi’s 
willingness to negotiate.87   
During the war, the relations between China and the United States, however, further 
improved. This rapprochement had already been perceptible in 1969, as China changed its 
attitude and viewed the Soviet Union as the major threat.88 Nevertheless, the negotiations about 
the ending of the war between China and the United States were not resumed before June 1970, 
when the US government would completely withdraw its forces from Cambodia. In response, 
China was willing to find a common solution and agreement with the United States in the second 
half of 1970. The North Vietnamese leadership, however, did not favor the rapprochement 
between China and the United States. In order to appease them, Zhou Enlai made a visit to the 
DRV between March 5 and 8, 1970, where he expressed China’s willingness to provide them 
with further support in their Vietnamese struggle. In doing so, he attempted to restrict the 
growing influence of the Soviet Union on North Vietnam. During this meeting, Le Duan 
suggested the formation of an international communist front under Chinese leadership in order to 
disapprove the Nixon Doctrine from 1969 and the coalition between Japan and the United 
States.89 The US government, however, sent Henry Kissinger on a secret visit to Beijing in July, 
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1971 in order to convince China to exert pressure on the North Vietnamese to open negotiations, 
but the Chinese leaders refused Henry Kissinger’s request to pressure North Vietnam to alter 
their attitude towards the Paris peace talks.90 Henry Kissinger’s visit to China and another one of 
President Nixon in 1972 were regarded as betrayal by Hanoi who felt deceived by the Chinese.91 
Although China promised to provide further aid to Hanoi, the North Vietnamese government 
concluded that China was more focused on improving its relationship with the United States than 
on the revolutionary unity with North Vietnam.92 They believed that the Chinese center of 
attention had shifted from the international communist struggle to the safeguarding of their own 
national interests.93 Thus, the Sino- American rapprochement further increased the tensions 
between China and North Vietnam. In 1971, Mao decided that it was time to end the war and 
therefore promoted the idea of postponing the liberation of South Vietnam and prompted North 
Vietnam to open serious negotiations with the United States as the Chinese attitude toward 
peaceful negotiations had changed during the years 1969 and 1971. Now, China was concerned 
about the growing influence of Soviet Union in Southeast Asia and feared that it could lose its 
position in the region. Zhai argues that the American presence and its strength were seen by 
China’s leadership as a counterbalance against the Soviet Union and that is why Mao came to the 
decision to preserve American power in the region to face the new threat of the Soviet Union.94 
North Vietnam, however, monitored these developments with great concern, as the Soviet- 
American relations were also improving. In order to prevent the loss of its major allies, Hanoi’s 
leaders had to find a solution. Thus, they decided that it was time for a showdown in the war and 
launched the Spring Offensive against the South in late March 1972. 120,000 North Vietnamese 
                                                          
90 Frey, Geschichte des Vietnamkriegs, 204-205; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, 196. 
91 McGregor, The Sino- Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union, 11. 
92 Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, 196. 
93 Ibid, 201. 
94 Zhai, “An Uneasy Relationship,”135; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, 198. 
64 
 
soldiers attacked the Central Highlands, the demilitarized zone and the border region of 
Cambodia northwest of Saigon. As a consequence, the US government authorized large-scale 
bombing of military targets in North Vietnam and the mining of North Vietnamese harbors. The 
US bombing, however, had significantly damaged the territory of the DRV. On May 9, 1972 the 
North Vietnamese ambassador met with Zhou Enlai in order to ask for China’s help in mine-
clearing of the North Vietnamese harbors. Zhou Enlai affirmed the request and on May 12, the 
Chinese government announced in a statement that China condemned the US reaction of mining 
North Vietnamese ports and would further assist North Vietnam. In order to put the Chinese 
word into action, the first Chinese Mine Investigation Team was sent to Haiphong in late May 
which was responsible for acquainting themselves with the types and characters of the US mines 
and two month later, the first Chinese minesweeping vessels were sent to North Vietnam. The 
total number of minesweepers amounted to twelve between July 1972 and August 1973 with four 
additional support vessels. After North Vietnam had to close its ports because of mine-clearing, 
the resulting lack of petroleum became a serious problem. Thus, China helped to establish a 
pipeline system from south China to North Vietnam in order to solve the North Vietnamese 
petroleum issue.95  
On January 8, 1973, the peace negotiations in Paris between North Vietnam and the 
United States were resumed and the final treaty which ended the Vietnam War was signed on 
January 23. In this treaty, the warring factions agreed on that: 
The United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam 
by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, 
harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. […] Within sixty days of the signing of this 
Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Viet Nam of troops, military advisors, and military 
personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States. 
[…] The reunification of Viet Nam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of 
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discussions and agreements between North and South Viet Nam, without coercion or annexation by either party, 
and without foreign interference.96   
 
The Chinese leadership approved this arrangement of the Paris Peace Agreement and the 
withdrawal of the American troops. Although China’s government saw them as a counterbalance 
against the Soviet Union between 1969 and 1971, they now favored their disengagement from 
Vietnam, as the Chinese leaders assumed that the communist troops would win a victory over 
Saigon. Therefore, they encouraged Hanoi in their plan to unify the south. Beijing, however, 
believed that the reunification with South Vietnam should not immediately be implemented, but 
was a process of several years.97 This renewed disagreement caused Sino- North Vietnamese 
relations to worsen further. 
In the last years of the war, contentions over territorial borders between China and North 
Vietnam also frequently appeared. These disputes especially focused on the issue of ownership 
over the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Furthermore, military 
confrontations occurred along the Sino- Vietnamese border from 1973. These incidents further 
deteriorated the Sino- North Vietnamese relations which also could not be recovered after 
1975.98 
The Vietnam War was not only a war between North and South, but also a dispute 
between world powers in the cold war. For the communist forces, Vietnam was an important 
symbol for the international communist movement; however, the dissensions between China and 
the Soviet Union significantly affected China’s involvement in the war especially in terms of 
strategy and policy. The rivalry between the two major communist nations for the dominant 
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position and the leadership among other communist nations impeded Chinese warfare.99 
Therefore, the Vietnam War can also to be regarded as an essential element in the Sino- Soviet 
dispute of the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The relationship between China and North Vietnam, however, 
also suffered from the war and reached its nadir with the outbreak of the Sino- Vietnamese War 
in 1979.100 Nevertheless, China’s support played an essential role for North Vietnam, as it 
prevented a further US expansion into the North and contributed to numerous victories over the 
American troops. The significant assistance was provided by many Chinese engineers and 
workers who were sent to North Vietnam in order to keep up the infrastructure. These workers 
did astonishing work by building a total of 1215 km of roads.101 This support, however, also 
caused its victims, as 1100 Chinese died and 4300 were wounded during their deployment in 
Vietnam.102
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4. Comparison between China’s actions in Korea and Vietnam 
The Korean War and the Vietnam War were both significant for China’s history and 
development in the 20th century. China was involved in both wars and their intervention in 
Vietnam had certain similarities with their military actions in Korea, but also differed in many 
aspects.  Some of these similarities have already become obvious by considering the reasons for 
China to get involved in each conflict. After the Korean War broke out in 1950, it was the 
highest priority for Mao and the Chinese government to preserve China’s national security and to 
ensure the inviolability of its borders. This fear of being attacked and occupied by foreign 
powers originated from past experiences and reminded the Chinese of their history as a semi-
colony. Thus, the US presence and its aggression in Korea were regarded as a threat to China’s 
national security and became a problem which had to be actively faced by the CCP at that time. 
North Korea served as a buffer state and shielded the Chinese borders from the events happening 
in South Korea, but when the war broke out and the American troops further advanced north, the 
concerns that China could be attacked in the future increased among China’s leadership. In order 
to prevent and to forestall such an attack of their own territory, the Chinese government decided 
to approve China’s entry into the war.  
Similar to the Korean War, the question of the national security also played an essential 
role at the time of the Vietnam War. Mao and his comrades feared that the war events in 
Vietnam might be expanded to Chinese territory after North Vietnam fell into the hands of the 
United States. Furthermore, they assumed that the United States would regard the invasion of 
North Vietnam as only the first step in order to occupy China. Therefore, Vietnam, like Korea, 
was considered to be a buffer state between the US military presence in South Vietnam and the 
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Chinese mainland and the fall of this buffer state would mean a direct and serious threat to 
China’s borders and consequently to the security of its people.  
Another similar reason to enter both wars was Mao’s feeling of obligation to help and 
support other national liberation movements of oppressed countries in the world and China’s 
brotherly relationship to other communist nations. As Mao regarded the Communist Party of 
China as the vanguard of these communist liberation movements in Korea and in Vietnam, 
assistance in both wars was inevitable in order to express China’s commitment in the fight 
against imperialism and capitalism. Furthermore, both Korea and Vietnam offered the possibility 
to further spread the communist influence in Asia and to expand the ties between China and the 
worldwide communist community. In contrast to Korea, however, the reasons to enter the 
Vietnam War were also influenced by disagreements and problems between China and the 
Soviet Union. Due to a re-orientation of the Soviet Union by Chruschtschow in the 1950s after 
Stalin’s death, China began to doubt the communist attitude of its former sister state. China’s 
doubts and its criticism of the new revisionist Soviet policies resulted in a rift and a rivalry 
between both countries. This rivalry also affected China’s determination to participate in the 
Vietnam War in order to show its superiority over the Soviet Union as the only vanguard of 
communist liberation movements. If China had refused to help North Vietnam in its war against 
the United States, Ho Chih Minh and his comrades would have turned to the Soviet Union for 
support and China would have lost all its influence and status among the other nations in the 
communist community. In order to avoid such a loss of power and loss of face, it was necessary 
for Mao to participate, whereas the Korean War was not characterized by a growing rivalry 
between China and the Soviet Union or a similar need for China to build a paternalistic 
relationship with its neighbors.  
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Furthermore, Korea and Vietnam have shared a historical background with China. In the 
past both were closely tied to Imperial China as tributary states and were highly influenced by 
Chinese culture. Thus, the Chinese people have felt connected to Korea and Vietnam, and the 
aggression of the United States against both countries evoked a feeling of solidarity. In addition, 
China had already supported Vietnam in its fight for independence against the French some years 
earlier. Therefore, a military intervention against Korea or Vietnam was considered to be an 
attack on the Chinese mainland itself and this was not acceptable for Mao and the Chinese 
people. Mao expressed that it was the obligation to help both countries in their fight against 
imperialism in order to save not only China’s borders, but also its reputation as a strong nation in 
Asia and its people (including the Korean and Vietnamese people).  
In contrast to the reasons to enter the Vietnam War, however, the Chinese reasons to 
participate in the Korean War were not only characterized by the threat of the United States, but 
also by the threat of the Guomindang on Taiwan as well as of a newly emerging alliance between 
the United States and Japan. In the early 1950s, China still had to deal with the Nationalists who 
had to flee to Taiwan after the Communists declared the foundation of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949. At the time when the Korean War started in 1950, the nationalists were not yet 
defeated and could be encouraged to reorganize in order to attack the Chinese mainland. In order 
to eliminate all these possibilities and to avoid all threats for the newly established People’s 
Republic of China, Mao had to take suitable measures.  
While comparing and contrasting the motives which induced China’s participation in the 
Korean and the Vietnam War, it becomes clear that a military intervention was not easily decided. 
In both cases, a lot of points militated for, but also against a Chinese interference. Concerning 
the Korean War, however, it is evident that the age of the People’s Republic of China played a 
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significant role in the decision-making process. The Chinese government seemed rather 
precarious in this process which was illustrated by the heated debate and the disagreements 
among the leadership of the CCP. The People’s Republic of China was founded one year earlier 
and its troops had never fought outside of China. The only combat experiences were gained 
during the civil war against the troops of the Guomindang, but the Korean War meant a conflict 
of much larger dimensions for the Chinese. These concerns were emphasized by Nie Rongzhen: 
“After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, we badly needed a lasting international 
peace to heal the wounds of the civil war and to develop our national economy.”1 The CCP 
leadership was also driven by the fear of a war against the United States on Chinese territory 
which would shake the foundations of the newly established nation and weaken the 
legitimization of the CCP. Thus, the decision-making process and the Chinese reasons were 
strongly influenced by concerns about China’s national security because of China’s inexperience 
and its immaturity as a nation. At the time of the Vietnam War, the Chinese leadership also 
worried about China’s national security, but they could fall back on experiences from the events 
in Korea. Based on these experiences, the government knew what kind of impact such a war had 
on the Chinese people and that this impact would negatively influence and jeopardize the 
economic development of China. The Great Leap Forward had already led to a great famine in 
1960 and the Chinese economy and people still suffered from its consequences. A military 
intervention in Vietnam would be another burden for the whole country. Therefore, China tried 
to convince North Vietnam to postpone the unification with the South and promoted a peaceful 
environment and co-existence between the Asian nations. Uncertainly about whether or not 
China should fight another war against the United States so soon after their confrontations in 
Korea also influenced the Chinese decision-making process.   
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In terms of the Chinese support that was provided during the Korean War and the 
Vietnam War, it becomes clear that both North Korea and North Vietnam were reliant on 
China’s assistance in order to resist the US troops, as Mao’s China was one of most essential 
allies for both Kim Il Sung and Ho Chi Minh, apart from the Soviet Union. In both wars, China 
was also extremely restrained and cautious in the beginning. During the Korean War, the 
Chinese government approved the deployment of troops, but only in order to help defend Korea 
and not for the purpose of actively attacking enemy troops, as the CCP leadership did not 
approve the war and Mao wanted to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States 
in the beginning. This attitude of not confronting a strong world power who had already 
successfully fought in World War II could also result from the insecurity of the newly- 
established People’s Republic of China. More than ten years later, at the beginning of the 
Vietnam War, the Chinese government officially advocated for a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
They opposed an immediate and forced unification of North and South and recommended that 
North Vietnam concentrate on domestic problems first. Thus, the Chinese attitude and behavior 
were similarly cautious in both cases. Mao also promised Ho Chi Minh to send troops, but only 
if American ground forces were deployed. Again, China wanted to prevent a direct military 
confrontation between American and Chinese soldiers.  
Another similarity can be found when we examine Chinese statements made shortly 
before their troops were sent to Korea and Vietnam. The Chinese government indicated again 
and again that China did not advocate a war and was looking for peace among the Asian nations. 
Furthermore, they sent several warnings to the US government in which it was stated that a 
crossing of the 38th (Korea) or 17th parallel (Vietnam) would result in China’s intervention. If the 
troops of the United States disregarded these conditions and started attacking the territory of 
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China’s communist sister states (Korea and Vietnam), China would not hesitate to fulfill its 
obligations and to come to the assistance of the affected countries. Moreover, an anti-America 
attitude characterized China’s propaganda shortly before its entry into the Korean and the 
Vietnam War was decided. Many mass demonstrations broke out among the Chinese throughout 
the whole country which opposed the war policy of the United States and its aggression in Korea 
and Vietnam. In addition to the growing hatred of the United States within China’s population, 
the tone of the Chinese foreign policy with respect to the US in speeches of Mao and other CCP 
leaders was also further sharpened. They no longer spoke of a peaceful co-existence among the 
countries of the world, but emphasized the fight against the American troops and condemned US 
imperialism.  
As the Chinese government was concerned that the war events in Korea and Vietnam 
could be expanded to Chinese territory, their first measures in both cases were to strengthen the 
national defense of China within the border areas. In terms of the Korean War, the CCP leaders 
worried about the security of the areas around the Yalu River and therefore sent troops to these 
border areas to further reinforce their defense. Similarly to Korea, the military presence was 
increased near the Sino- Vietnamese border and Chinese defensive forces were deployed in its 
southern provinces in the case of Vietnam.  
An important difference between China’s involvement in the Korean War and in the 
Vietnam War, however, is the nature of the troops that were sent into the war zones. In order to 
support North Korea, the Chinese People’s Volunteers were formed who were named 
“volunteers” in order to avoid a formal Chinese war declaration and who crossed the Yalu River 
unannounced and undetected between October 14 and October 16, 1950. These troops were 
ordered to actively intervene in the battles and to aid the Korean People’s Army. Apart from 
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fighting, these Chinese troops also took care of construction work, logistics and the maintenance 
of transportation routes. In contrast, the Chinese government decided to send only support units 
to North Vietnam which mainly consisted of engineering groups and were responsible for road 
repair and construction works during the Vietnam War. These support troops were not combat 
units and did not actively attack US soldiers, but assisted North Vietnam by providing manpower 
and material to keep the infrastructure intact.  
Another substantial difference concerning China’s troops involved in Korea and Vietnam 
is the total number of soldiers who were deployed in both wars. A total of 2.3 million soldiers 
fought in Korea against US troops, whereas the number of people belonging to support troops in 
Vietnam only amounted to over 320,000 people between June 1965 and March 1968. These 
numbers demonstrate that the Chinese involvement in Korea was much greater in terms of 
people’s deployment than in Vietnam.  
By examining China’s behavior and the support they provided during the wars, a shift of 
approach between the Korean War and the Vietnam War becomes apparent. Although both 
Korea and Vietnam were strongly dependent on the Chinese assistance, China was more reserved 
during the Vietnam War. The Chinese government provided financial aid and military aid in the 
form of weapons to the Vietnamese troops, helped to train pilots and allowed the People’s Army 
of Vietnam to use some of their military basis in the South, but they did not send infantry units 
who directly fought against US troops, unlike in Korea. This reluctance also becomes evident if 
we take into consideration the number of troops which were in use in Korea and Vietnam. The 
number of soldiers deployed in Korea dramatically exceeds the number of troops in Vietnam.  
What, however, could be the reason for China’s changing attitude and their decision to 
only send support troops to Vietnam instead of providing the same form of military aid they had 
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sent to Korea more than ten years earlier?  One reason could be the memory of the Korean War 
and its consequences for China. Although Mao and the CCP leadership officially celebrated the 
Korean War as a great success and victory for China, it was also clear to them that the war had 
claimed numerous Chinese victims and involved high costs for such a young nation. Therefore, 
the Chinese government did not approve of the Vietnam War at the beginning and decided to 
reduce its support by only sending engineering and defensive troops in form of antiaircraft 
artillery units. At the same time they were reminded of the outcomes of the Korean War in which 
they also had to defend and assert their position as a newly-established country within the 
international community, but by the time of the Vietnam War, the Chinese circumstances had 
changed. China had already gained experience during their military confrontations in Korea and 
its strength and power were better reorganized by the international community. In addition, it 
was necessary for China, as a fully established communist state which newly emerged on the 
international stage and was competing with the Soviet Union for the leadership of the communist 
movement in the world, to think about possible political consequences of supporting military 
confrontations outside of China. China’s leaders promoted a peaceful environment among the 
nations in Asia after the Geneva Conference and by sending attacking units, the Chinese 
government could endanger China’s credibility, its international image and a potential 
rapprochement with other nations. 
Other reasons for their changing view could be the immense domestic problems China 
had to face some years before the outbreak of the Vietnam War. The Great Leap Forward, the 
campaign which was initiated in 1958 in order to increase the industrial production and to 
supersede the Western nations in terms of economy within five years, had proved 
counterproductive and resulted in a great famine and an economic collapse. Furthermore, 
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revisionism within the CCP in response to the failures of the Great Leap Forward worried Mao 
and triggered the Cultural Revolution. Under these circumstances, it was not an easy decision 
whether China was able to provide sufficient support and to fight another war against the United 
States. All these reasons could prompt the Chinese government to be more reserved in the case 
of Vietnam and to send supporting troops instead of numerous military units.   
In terms of willingness to negotiate, China’s attitude during the Korean War did not 
feature many difference to their attitude towards negotiation in the Vietnam War. When the war 
in Korea broke out, Mao was not willing to discuss any armistice before 1952. After two years of 
war, heavy losses on both sides and a military standstill between the troops, Mao and other CCP 
leaders changed their opinions about peace talks in order to solve the Korea question peacefully. 
Thus, the armistice agreement, which marked the end of the war, was signed by Peng Dehuai on 
July 27, 1953 in Panmunjom. China’s change in attitude concerning peace talks in Korea is 
almost identical to their reaction in Vietnam. In the beginning of the war between 1966 and 1967, 
China rigorously opposed any form of negotiations with the United States, but in 1971 China’s 
willingness to support peace talks changed. As a result of improved relations between China and 
the United States, the US government was able to convince the Chinese leadership to reconsider 
their attitude towards an armistice by promoting negotiations. Thus, pressure could be exerted on 
North Vietnam, whereupon the Paris peace accords could be signed on January 27, 1973 which 
ended the military involvement of the United States in Vietnam. Although China’s attitude 
towards peace negotiations in Korea had changed because of the seriously deteriorating military 
situation on the battlefield in the first half of 1952, whereas the changing opinion in Vietnam can 
be attributed to the increased contact and improved exchange between the United States and 
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China, it is evident that the Chinese government realized the necessity of rethinking their view of 
negotiations with their former enemies in both the Korean and the Vietnam War.  
When comparing the Korean War and the Vietnam War, it is also essential to examine the 
role of the Soviet Union in connection with China’s involvement in the wars. During the conflict 
in Korea, China was also dependent on Soviet support, which was illustrated by the issue of the 
promised air cover. The Chinese government regarded this Soviet air cover as one of the most 
crucial prerequisites, whereupon they authorized the deployment of Chinese troops in Korea. 
Although the Soviet Union tried to avoid a direct military involvement in Korea, they provided 
not only North Korea but also China with numerous weapons and other military equipment. 
Furthermore, they were willing to train Chinese pilots and prepare them for their operations in 
Korea. Thus, it becomes clear that the Soviet Union occupied the central position as the major 
provider of military aid during the Korean War, because they not only supplied North Korea with 
necessary material, but also China. In Vietnam, however, these circumstances had changed. The 
Soviet Union still played the role of one of the two most important allies of North Vietnam, but 
China had assumed the earlier role of the Soviet Union in terms of support because of the rivalry 
between the two nations. Thus, China assisted in the training of pilots and sent a large amount of 
weapons and other everyday items to North Vietnam in order to prove its position as a loyal 
communist sister state. What, however, led to this change of roles between China and the Soviet 
Union? At the time of the Korean War, the Chinese nation was still very young and the threat of 
the Nationalists on Taiwan still existed. China was therefore not autonomously in the position to 
provide large- scale support to North Korea. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had enough 
time to recover from World War II and was able to supply its ally with a large amount of also 
more sophisticated military equipment, as described by Nie Rongzhen: “The NKPA had been 
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equipped with Soviet- manufactured weapons, which were more advanced than what the Chinese 
army had at that time.”2 Furthermore, the relationship between the Soviet Union and China was 
not yet negatively affected, whereas the Vietnam War was highly influenced by the Sino- Soviet 
power struggle and the worsening relations of the two communist countries. In order to show its 
North Vietnamese ally and also the rest of the world which nation would be the better leader for 
the worldwide communist movement, China had to compete with the Soviet Union by 
demonstrating its willingness, determination and ability to support the North Vietnamese people 
in their struggle.  In addition, China was already experienced in fighting a war against the United 
States which enabled the Chinese government to be very well informed about the support which 
was necessary to be successful in such a military conflict. Thus, China took more and more the 
key role in supporting North Vietnam, whereas the Soviet Union played the major role as main 
provider in Korea.  
By examining the consequences and the outcomes of the wars, it becomes evident that 
China’s support was truly essential in Korea as well as in Vietnam, as the Chinese troops 
contributed to numerous successful defeats of the United States. Without the Chinese assistance, 
both wars might have a totally different outcome for all warring parties. North Korea and North 
Vietnam were reliant on their two main allies the Soviet Union and China, because they were not 
able to fight against the United States all by themselves without any outside support. In terms of 
the consequences for the Chinese people, the Korean and the Vietnam War, however, greatly 
differ in the number of soldiers who lost their lives in the battles. In Korea, 148,400 soldiers died, 
whereas in Vietnam only 1,100 Chinese did not survive the war. This relatively low death toll in 
Vietnam could be ascribed to the character of the Chinese deployment in general. As mentioned 
earlier, the Chinese deployment in Korea differed from their commitment in Vietnam, in terms of 
                                                          
2 Li, Millet, and Yu, Mao's Generals Remember Korea, 47. 
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the extent of provided support, as the number of Chinese people fighting in Korea was 
considerably higher than the amount of Chinese in the Vietnam War. As a result of China’s 
further restraint concerning the deployment of people, the number of Chinese casualties in 
Vietnam did not reach the death toll of 1953 in Korea.  
Furthermore, China was not a young and inexperienced nation anymore in the 1960s, but 
became a strong and independent nation which was interested in further extending its foreign 
relations. At the time of the Korean War, China’s foreign relations were mainly limited to 
communist states of the Soviet bloc and China had to find its place among other nations. More 
than ten years later, however, China had gained its recognition as a nation and was therefore no 
longer interested in proving itself by sending attacking units to Vietnam, as its troops had already 
fought in Korea and showed that China was able to resist other powerful states.  
The Korean War and the Vietnam War also differ in the development of the relationships 
between China and its communist sister states Korea and Vietnam in the end of the war and 
afterwards. Concerning Korea, the war became the foundation of the Sino- North Korean 
alliance and contributed to a friendly and brotherly relationship which still exists today. The 
Chinese People’s Volunteers stayed in the country after the Korean War came to an end and 
supported North Korea’s reconstruction in the post-war years until 1958. The Sino- Vietnamese 
relationship, however, suffered from the disagreements which appeared among North 
Vietnamese and Chinese leaders during the Vietnam War. The Chinese support troops did not 
even stay until the end of the war, but were completely withdrawn by 1970 because of the 
worsening bilateral relationship. These disagreements and the following territorial conflicts 
finally resulted in the Sino- Vietnamese War in early 1979. In comparison, it becomes clear that 
the Korean War helped to further strengthen the bonds between the two allies, North Korea and 
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China, whereas the Vietnam War was the trigger for China and Vietnam to drift apart and did not 
contribute to the development of a brotherly alliance between the two communist countries. This 
separation of China and Vietnam during and after the war might also be influenced by the 
growing rivalry of China and the Soviet Union and their competing for the leadership claim of 
the communist world.  
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5. Conclusion 
The Korean War and the Vietnam War were both significant events in Cold War history 
in which the People’s Republic of China was involved. This analysis of Chinese involvement in 
Korea and in Vietnam shows both similarities and also striking differences between the two 
interventions. Both times, China participated in a war against the United States, the epitome of 
imperialism and capitalism, and consequently China’s ideological nemesis. Both times, they 
supported the opposing party in order to prevent the extension of US influence in Asia.  
The comparison in the previous chapter demonstrates that China and its leadership drew 
lessons from the experiences of the Korean War that kept them from militarily interfering in the 
war events in Vietnam. China also did not actively take part in the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 
and did not sign the armistice agreement in contrast to their earlier behavior in Korea where the 
People’s Republic of China participated in the peace negotiations and Peng Dehuai signed the 
final agreement in 1953. The signing of this agreement by the commander of the Chinese 
People’s Volunteers shows that China officially belonged to the warring parties in the Korean 
conflict, whereas in Vietnam they played a different role as only a supportive communist sister 
state, not officially fighting against the United States. The comparison also demonstrates China’s 
development as a nation and diplomatic actor. At the time of the Korean War, the People’s 
Republic of China was a very young nation that had to face many problems. The country was 
shattered by the Chinese Civil War for years and suffered from the military conflicts between 
Nationalists and Communists. Therefore, the economic and social order had to be rebuilt and 
China had to step out of its isolation and start developing foreign policy relationships. When the 
war in Korea broke out, the Soviet Union and North Korea were one of China’s closest allies. 
Thus, it was necessary for China to support them in the war in order to increase these friendly 
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ties and to gain recognition as a new powerful nation on the international stage. By the time of 
the conflicts in Vietnam, however, China’s circumstances had changed, because China had 
fought an international conflict against the United States ten years earlier. After the Korean War, 
China realized that it was able to resist a superpower such as the United States. The young state 
had grown into a mature and confident nation that could defend its place in the world. 
Furthermore, it was no longer dependent on the Soviet Union and was able to expand its 
international contacts, even with the United States, which had a great impact on China’s 
involvement in Vietnam.  
What led to this change in Chinese thinking and acting? I argue that two main reasons 
likely caused this rethinking; internal problems and foreign-policy issues. The internal problems 
were related to the outcomes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, whereas 
the foreign-policy issues can be connected to the deteriorating relationship between China, the 
Soviet Union and North Vietnam, as well as the improving Chinese relations with the United 
States during the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, China supported North Korea and North Vietnam 
by all available means in order to encourage national liberation movements and the worldwide 
communist revolution. Thus, it is necessary to consider China’s role when dealing with the 
Korean and the Vietnam War, as North Korea and North Vietnam were not able to fight such 
wars and to successfully resist the United States without the aid and backup of the Chinese 
nation.
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